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Imagining an Islamic State 
in Indonesia: From Darul Islam
TO JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH
Sometime in September 1962, S. M. Kartosoewirjo,* 1 the leader of a once formidable 
insurgency that had proclaimed an Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, 
Nil), was executed by a firing squad of the Indonesian Republic. This act has been 
recorded as the beginning of the end of the Islamic State and its so-called Darul Islam 
(Abode of Islam) rebellion.2 Forty years later, however, a young man called Iqbal wrote 
the following before he blew himself up along with hundreds of others at the Sari Club 
in Bali on October 12, 2002:
Today I say: that I am a child of DI/NII [Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia] 
who is ready to sacrifice myself for Islam. Remember, o mujahideen of 
Malingping,3 how our imam, S. M. Kartosuwirjo, built and upheld and 
proclaimed the independence of the Islamic State of Indonesia with the blood and 
lives of martyrs, not by relaxing and fooling around the way we do today. If you 
are serious about seeing the glory of the buried Islamic State of Indonesia rise
My thanks to Greg Fealy, Sidney Jones, Kit Collier, Ken Ward, Solahudin, Ed Aspinall, Robert Cribb, 
Ahmad Muhajir, Martin van Bruinessen, David Jenkins, Marcus Mietzner, Jajat Burhanudin, and Sita 
Dewi
11 have spelled Indonesian names in accordance with the preference of the individual concerned except 
for direct quotations from published sources, in which the original has been preserved.
2 See, for example, B. J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1971), p. 75; Hoik H. Dengel, Darul Islam dan Kartosuwirjo: Langkah Perwujudan Angan-Angan yang Gagal 
(Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995), p. 207.
3 This is a Sundanese spelling of the West Javanese town of Malimping.
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again, shed your blood so that you won't be ashamed to face Allah, you who 
acknowledge yourselves to be children of DI/NII.4
The Bali bombings may be remembered internationally as the mark of al-Qaeda in 
Southeast Asia. But what of this "buried Islamic State"? And why would such a state— 
buried or simply forgotten to most Indonesians—be for Iqbal so compelling?
In its path-breaking work on the problem of militant Islam in Indonesia, the 
International Crisis Group (ICG) has identified the crucial importance of the Darul 
Islam (DI) movement and its "very extended family." The ICG concludes that,
Over the last fifty-five years, that movement has produced splinters and 
offshoots that range from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to non-violent religious groups. 
Every time the older generation seems on the verge of passing into irrelevance, a 
new generation of young militants, inspired by DI’s history and the mystique of 
an Islamic state, emerges to give the movement a new lease on life.5
In this article, I will attempt to illuminate the part of Darul Islam's past that 
connects Iqbal, the recent recruit, to Kartosoewirjo, the legend. I will suggest that Darul 
Islam is not so much a "movement" as a backward-looking community whose 
members regard themselves as citizens of an alternative state. They know not "Darul 
Islam," but the "Islamic State of Indonesia"—a state still in existence, however 
vestigial, and continuous with the state proclaimed by Kartosoewirjo in 1949. This is 
Darul Islam's premise. Accordingly, when Darul Islam ideologue Ustadz Adi is asked 
in an interview, "Do you agree with an Islamic state?" naturally he responds: "For me, 
the issue is no longer to agree or to disagree. The issue is one of defense. For us, an 
Islamic state is no longer a discourse but, rather, represents a national identity."6 Thus, 
instead of a unified manifestation of collective action (a movement), the phenomenon 
of Darul Islam is perhaps best understood as a form of collective identity, and one that 
encompasses the range of movements and dispositions noted by the ICG. It is, in its 
own terms, a nation. And it is a nation to us, too, if we accept Benedict Anderson's 
stripped-back definition of the nation as "an imagined political community—and 
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign."7
In his book Imagined Communities, Anderson is puzzled by the remarkable 
endurance and political power of nationalism, despite its "philosophical poverty." He 
suggests it would be easier to understand it not as an ideology but as something akin 
to kinship or religion. It is the sense of fraternity in the nation—the "imagined 
community"—"that makes it possible over the last two centuries, for so many millions 
of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings." This 
leads to his formulation of "the central problem posed by nationalism," a question that 
recalls us to Iqbal's suicide attack: "What makes the shrunken imaginings of recent 
history ... generate such colossal sacrifices?"8
4 Last Testament of Iqbal, alias Arnasan, alias Acong, n.d., author collection.
5 International Crisis Group (hereafter ICG), Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian 
Embassy Bombing, Asia Report n. 92, February 22, 2005, p. i.
6 "DII Belum Merdeka," Majalah Darul Islam, September 7, 2001, p. 38.
7 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1991), p. 6.
8 Ibid., pp. 7, 5.
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Here I approach the question by way of an investigation into Darul Islam post- 
Kartosoewirjo, when the Islamic State survived underground during Suharto's New 
Order regime. First I recapitulate the history of Darul Islam as a rebellion during the 
Indonesian national revolution. Then I chart the revival of the Islamic State during the 
1970s under the auspices of close presidential advisor and intelligence czar Ali 
Moertopo. I argue that this revival was the result of Darul Islam taking advantage of a 
window of political opportunity, as two sections of the New Order security apparatus 
rivaled each other for control of the Darul Islam network. Finally, I show how the 
revival indirectly led to the emergence of the more radical offshoot, Jemaah Islamiyah. 
I argue that Jemaah Islamiyah splintered from Darul Islam in 1993 primarily because 
its leadership rejected Kartosoewirjo's Islamic State. Through the course of this 
historical narrative, I hope to illustrate something of the "imaginative power"9 of Darul 
Islam's religious nationalism, as well as its limitations.
In this task, I have benefited from access to somewhat fragmentary information 
from case file documents found in Indonesian court archives. I draw on two cases in 
particular. The first is that of Haji Ismail Pranoto, or Hispran, heard in the District 
Court of Surabaya in 1978. The Hispran case was the most extensively publicized of the 
trials associated with that specter of Islamic extremism known as "Komando Jihad," a 
group supposedly responsible for a series of bombings that resulted in the arrest, 
beginning in the late 1970s, of hundreds of Muslim suspects. Komando Jihad provoked 
much popular doubt and suspicion among a public wary of the New Order 
manipulating Islam in order to discredit the regime's Muslim political rivals. Covered 
regularly by the press, the Hispran trial was one of the most controversial: Muslim 
leader and former prime minister Mohammad Natsir called Hispran "an agent 
provocateur run by Ali Murtopo."10 The second case is that of Dodo Muhammad Darda, 
son of S. M. Kartosoewirjo, heard in the District Court of Bandung from 1983-84. Both 
Hispran and Dodo were jailed for attempting to revive the Islamic State of Indonesia.
The Rebellion
The Darul Islam rebellion originated amid the Indonesian guerrilla campaign for 
independence against the Dutch in West Java, a campaign largely fought under the 
auspices of the mainstream Islamic political party Masyumi. S. M. Kartosoewirjo, a 
Muslim politician known for his uncompromising stance towards the Dutch, was one 
of the founders of Masyumi as a political party in 1945. In 1947, he became the 
Masyumi representative for West Java, in charge of coordinating its guerrilla units, 
Hizbullah and Sabilillah. Van Dijk notes that, at this early stage, the Masyumi units 
were "just two of many guerrilla organizations fighting alongside the official 
Republican Army against the Dutch in West Java," but they saw themselves as the 
most important, and as the "Republic's 'second army' ... the first army being the 
Siliwangi Division of the official Republican Army in West Java."11 Kartosoewirjo, it
91 borrow this term from Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 158.
10 David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), p. 57.
11 C. Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1981), p. 77.
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seems, was still loyal to the Republic. One account suggests he proclaimed an Islamic 
state as early as 1945 but retracted his declaration after Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed 
the Republic.12 In 1946, he was still calling for ideological differences with the 
Republican leaders to be put aside until independence had been won, at which point it 
could be determined democratically whether Islam or some other ideology would be 
the basis of the state.13 He did, however, gradually distance himself from Masyumi and 
take a harder line with the Dutch. The Renville Treaty, signed with the Netherlands on 
January 17, 1948, was the catalyst for Kartosoewirjo's break with the Republic. 
Republican leaders portrayed Renville, which ceded West Java to the Dutch, as a 
temporary strategic withdrawal, but for Kartosoewirjo—as for many fighters based in 
West Java—it was a betrayal of the revolution. Large sections of Hizbullah and 
Sabilillah defied the order to withdraw.14 In February, Kartosoewirjo led a conference 
at Cisayong that effectively suspended Masyumi in West Java and converted its 
organizational apparatus into an Islamic Council (Majelis Islam), with Kartosoewirjo as 
imam (political and religious leader). The remaining Hizbullah and Sabilillah troops 
formed into the Islamic Army of Indonesia (Tentara Islam Indonesia). By year's end, 
Kartosoewirjo was releasing statements in the name of the Islamic State of Indonesia.15
Also by year's end, the Dutch had initiated their second military action, and 
Sukarno and Hatta had been captured. For Kartosoewirjo, this was a mixed blessing. It 
gave him the pretext to declare the Republic dead and assert his role in the revolution, 
but the Dutch action was considered a violation of Renville and, as such, triggered the 
return of the Siliwangi Division to West Java. To the surprise of Siliwangi, on its return 
it met armed resistance from Islamic Army troops who now considered West Java their 
territory alone. The result was what Darul Islam refers to as "triangular warfare": 
Darul Islam against both Dutch and Republican forces. Himawan Soetanto, a former 
Siliwangi commander who, as a young man, fought the Darul Islam in West Java, 
recalls his opponents' determination: "Fighting against them was tougher than if you 
compare it to fighting against the Dutch. [That was] because of their ideology—they 
were fighting for an Islamic state in Indonesia."16 In the midst of this complicated 
situation, on August 7,1949, Kartosoewirjo officially proclaimed the Islamic State.17 His 
great conceit was to claim that, given the Republican "surrender" to the Dutch at 
Renville, the State had been established in a vacuum of power. Announcing the 
proclamation, he wrote,
Praise be to God, at a moment that is vacant (a vacuum) [sic], at a moment when 
there is no authority and no administration responsible ... thus at a critical 
moment ... the Muslim Community of the Indonesian Nation is so bold as to take 
a stand and position that is clear and explicit for the entire world: the
12 Henri J. Alers, Om een Rode ofGroene Merdeka (Eindhoven: Vulkaan, 1956), p. 73 and p. 240 ff., cited in 
Boland, Struggle o f Islam, p. 57.
13 Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner o f Islam, p. 85.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 86; on the Cisayong conference, see Dengel, Darul Islam dan Kartosuwirjo, p. 67.
16 Interview with Himawan Soetanto, Jakarta, July 25, 2007.
17 Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner o f Islam, p. 92.
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proclamation of the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia, 7 August 
1949.18
Kartosoewirjo later announced that the national struggle for independence, which had 
been waged over the last four years, was over. Now a holy war (perang suci) would 
take its place until the Islamic State is established "100 percent de facto and de jure 
over all of Indonesia."19
The "betrayal" represented by Renville and the "vacuum of power" would become 
recurrent themes in Darul Islam's nationalist mythology. And because the Islamic State 
was forged in the heat of Indonesia's revolutionary struggle, it sought legitimacy not 
just from Islam, but from the same revolutionary nationalism that fired the struggle for 
the Republic. Thus the state that Darul Islam conceived had strong resemblances with 
its Republican sibling. For example, considering its constitution (Kanun Azasy), Van 
Dijk concludes, "Apart from the difference in terminology and the acknowledgement 
of the syari'ah, or Islamic Law, as the dominant legal system, the Kanun Azasy closely 
resembled the 1945 Constitution, which in fact was taken as its model, with some 
modifications."20 According to the Kanun Azasy, the Islamic State would, in fact, be a 
"Republik"—though it favored the equivalent Islamic term, "Djumhuryah."21 But what 
makes Darul Islam identity unique is its fusion of 1940s revolutionary nationalism with 
Qur'anic precept and Prophetic example. This fusion is symbolized in its official flag— 
red over white with a crescent and star—the quintessential emblem of Islam set against 
the same colors that represent the Indonesian Republic.22
In the 1950s, the rebellion became increasingly ruthless, especially towards 
civilians, and, writes B. J. Boland, "formed one of the greatest worries for the 
government of the Republic of Indonesia."23 The rebellion encompassed not just 
mountainous West Java but also parts of Central Java. Darul Islam rebellions 
characterized by local concerns also emerged in South Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and 
Aceh. While local factors varied, according to Van Dijk the rebellions shared two 
proximate causes. First, advocates felt a sense of grievance at the ascendancy of the 
Republican army over irregular troops and the attendant disputes over which elements 
of the irregular forces would be demobilized and which would be incorporated into 
the regular army. Second, there was disaffection with the central government's 
increasing control over the provinces.24 In Java, the rebellion peaked in the mid-to-late 
1950s and was marked by Darul Islam's burning of villages that it deemed had 
betrayed Islam. Holk H. Dengel cites figures, probably of Republican provenance, that 
suggest the impact of the conflict in West Java between 1953 and 1958: 11,521 people 
killed, 1,298 kidnapped, 362,009 houses burned, and 1,081,713 people internally 
displaced.25 The rebellion quickly subsided, however, in the early 1960s. One factor
18 "Makloemat Pemerintah Negara Islam Indonesia No. II/ 7," in Al-Chaidar, Pemikiran Politik Proklamator 
Negara Islam Indonesia S. M. Kartosoewirjo (Jakarta: Darul Falah, 1999), p. 102.
19 Ibid., p. 103.
20 Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner o f Islam, p. 96.
21 "Kanan Azasy Negara Islam Indonesia," in Boland, Struggle o f Islam, p. 257.
22 Ibid., p. 262.
23 Boland, Struggle o f Islam, p. 54.
24 Ibid., p. 340.
25 Dengel, Darul Islam dan Kartosuwirjo, p. 147.
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that helped quell the fighting was the Republican army's effective use of the "fence of 
legs" (pagar betis) tactic, in which villagers would be conscripted into military 
operations to encircle and then close in on Darul Islam redoubts.26 But the coup de grace 
was the capture of Kartosoewirjo in June 1962, followed by his execution. It is an 
indication of the importance of his charismatic leadership that soon after his arrest 
most of the movement surrendered to government forces. On August 1, 1962, thirty- 
two Darul Islam leaders signed a Joint Declaration (Ikrar Bersama), in which, in return 
for amnesty, they renounced the movement and pledged allegiance to the Indonesian 
Republic.27 The rebellion was effectively over.
The Revival
In the 1970s, Darul Islam underwent a revival, emerging not as an open rebellion 
but as a clandestine community. The scene had been set with Suharto's ascendance to 
power; Darul Islam and the New Order regime shared a militant anti-communism. 
Naturally, Darul Islam had been anti-communist from the beginning. During the 
rebellion, Kartosoewirjo, as imam of the Islamic State of Indonesia, had sent an 
apocalyptic secret letter to President Sukarno, copied to Prime Minister Mohammad 
Natsir, prophesizing a "Third World War" between Cold War powers. He warned of 
communist preparations to stage a coup d'etat and urged the Republic's leaders to 
protect the sovereignty of the state. He referred to his advice in an earlier secret letter, 
which counseled that there was no other way to ensure the security of the Indonesian 
state and nation other than "if the government of the Republic of Indonesia begins 
now, swiftly and surely, to eradicate Communism in every area." In return for official 
recognition of the Islamic State, he guaranteed that "the Indonesian Republic would 
have a friend for life in facing any potential [threat] from without and from within, 
especially in facing Communism."28
Kartosoewirjo's secret entreaties were rebuffed. But later, anti-communism did 
become the ideological pretext for an ambiguous relationship between Darul Islam and 
the state under Suharto. Darul Islam claims a role in the 1965-66 destruction of the 
Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI), although substantial 
evidence of its participation is yet to come to light.29 Still, it is clear that, early on, a 
close relationship with Darul Islam was cultivated by Suharto advisor Ali Moertopo 
and his rogue Special Operations intelligence organization, Opsus.30 Moertopo had the 
power and creativity to forge profitable alliances with politically compromised figures, 
often by rehabilitating them in return for their carrying out Opsus work. In this way, 
Opsus employed elements from the PRRI (Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik 
Indonesia, Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) rebellion, the PKI,
26 Karl D. Jackson, Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion: A Study o f Indonesian Political Behavior 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), p. 19.
27 "Ikrar-Bersama," Bandung, August 1,1962, author collection.
28 S. M. Kartosoewirjo to Sukarno in Boland, Struggle o f Islam, pp. 250-55.
29 ICG, Recycling Militants, p. 3.
301 use the word "organization" advisedly. Opsus was not a formal institution; rather, it was a network of 
agents and intelligence officers from other institutions that was loyal to Ali Moertopo. Moertopo, who 
from 1970 was also a member of the state intelligence agency Bakin, apparently used Opsus on an ad hoc 
basis for his more clandestine operations, ostensibly with Suharto's approval.
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and Darul Islam.31 For Darul Islam, Danu Mohammad Hasan, a commander from West 
Java who had signed the Joint Declaration in 1962, was the main point of contact. Danu 
was recruited by Opsus officer Aloysius Sugiyanto, who in early 1966 used him and his 
men to pursue pro-Sukarno officials who had gone into hiding, suspected of being 
involved in the earlier communist coup attempt.32 According to Sugiyanto, Danu led a 
failed operation to abduct Sukarno's foreign minister and intelligence chief, Dr. 
Subandrio.33
But it took another Darul Islam leader, Aceng Kurnia, to make the first moves to 
unearth the buried Islamic State. Aceng, a former bodyguard of Kartosoewirjo, was 
joined by a group of younger followers that included Ridwan, a former fighter under 
Hispran in Brebes, Central Java.34 According to Ridwan, Aceng alone had continued to 
champion the Islamic State since the fall of Kartosoewirjo. In 1968, Aceng, along with 
associates Djaja Sujadi and Kadar Solihat, had begun reviving contacts with Darul 
Islam leaders outside Java, most notably with Gaos Taufik in North Sumatra and Daud 
Beureu'eh in Aceh.35 That year, also, Ridwan and his associates established a ten- 
member study group to venerate past Darul Islam leaders and advance the argument 
that surrender in 1962 had been a mistake and that the struggle should continue. 
Attempts to recruit others faltered, however, amid recriminations over the 1962 defeat 
and the reluctance of veterans to commit without clear approval from their former 
senior commanders. But they eventually secured the support of one key former 
commander, also based in Bandung: Danu Mohammad Hasan.
The role of Danu, remarkably uncontroversial at the time, would become central to 
the Darul Islam revival. It was he who, in 1971, hosted at his Gang Madrosah residence 
Darul Islam's first post-Kartosoewirjo reunion. Danu, who claimed to work for the 
state intelligence agency Bakin, persuaded the others to let the agency sponsor the 
event. According to one account, 250,000 rupiah was made available by Opsus for the 
reunion.36 (Hilmi Aminuddin, one of Danu's sons and the deputy chair of the meeting 
committee, was tasked with receiving the funds.) Considering Darul Islam's long time 
in the wilderness, the reunion was a great success. Hundreds of members attended 
from across Indonesia, coming and going over three days from April 24-26. A number 
of Darul Islam leaders made speeches, including Djaja Sujadi and Hispran. And with
31 On PRRI and Darul Islam involvement, see Ken Conboy, The Second Front: Inside Asia's Most Dangerous 
Terrorist Network (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2006), pp. 14-15; on the PKI, see Heru Cahyono, 
Pangkopkamtib Jenderal Soemitro Dan Peristiwa 15 Januari '74 (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1998), p. 279.
32 Ken Conboy, Intel: Inside Indonesia's Intelligence Service (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2004), p. 140; 
Conboy, The Second Front, p. 15.
33 Interview with Aloysius Sugiyanto, Jakarta, May 11, 2008. The nature of Danu's relationship with Opsus 
is unclear. At his trial, Hispran claimed that he had once slept overnight at Danu's office in Bakin, the State 
Intelligence Coordinating Body that from 1970 became Moertopo's institutional home. See Haji Ismail 
Pranoto, court testimony in Hispran case. On Moertopo and Bakin, see Conboy, Intel, p. 75.
34 A1 Chaidar interview with Ridwan, October 8,1999.
35 Unpublished memoirs by Kang Edi, February 17, 2000, p. 2, author collection. Gaos Taufik was a former 
Lieutenant Colonel in the Til (Tentara Islam Indonesia) in West Java, until he was captured and forcibly 
transmigrated to Sumatra in 1955. Daud Beureu'eh was a long-time Islamic leader, the head of PUS A 
(Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh, All-Aceh Religious Scholars' Association) and the former Republican 
Governor of Aceh, who, in 1953, joined the Darul Islam rebellion after Aceh was subsumed into North 
Sumatra province. He was a long-time Islamic leader and head of
36 ICG, Recycling Militants in Indonesia, p. 4.
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government sponsorship came government participation. Two members of the military 
establishment attended: Colonel Dadang of the Siliwangi Command and Colonel Pitut 
Suharto, an Opsus operative whose special field was political Islam.37
Ridwan, who was a member of the reunion committee, answered questions about 
these unusual circumstances in a 2001 interview with Darul Islam Magazine:38
-  So this means the Nil was being used by intelligence?
-  Yes. Even Pitut Suharto attended then and gave a speech entitled "Nil Supports 
Golkar." Thus, since then it has been popular to say that the Nil was used by 
Bakin.
-  If it is clear they were being used, why did the mujahideen stay quiet?
-  Actually, from the beginning we wanted to use Bakin. We needed support for 
the movement. We didn't have funding, and support from the Muslim 
community [ummat] was less than total, so at the time we used Bakin.
-  What about the mujahideen, didn't they protest?
-  No one protested. Because at that time we saw Bakin as a protector and as an 
aid to security.
But, he says, despite government sponsorship, Darul Islam maintained an independent
agenda:
Behind the scenes at the reunion, a different perspective can be seen. All Nil 
exponents were preparing an internal re-coordination. From that meeting, the 
sharing of contacts and taking up of tasks began. Who was tasked in Sukabumi, 
Tasikmalaya, East Java, and so on. Subsequently regular meetings were held at 
Danu Muhammad Hasan's house.39
Thus, almost from the outset, the Darul Islam revival was based on a fundamental 
contradiction: the state's cooptation of an anti-state movement. The cooptation of 
antithetical elements was a classic Moertopo strategy. While Darul Islam might like to 
emphasize that its relationship with Moertopo was one of mutual exploitation, it is 
likely that it was more than just this. Moertopo had gained some trust within the 
community by cultivating the impression that he was a covert Darul Islam 
sympathizer. Such an impression, however naive, appears to have rested on 
Moertopo's former role as a fighter with the Hizbullah guerrilla army during the 
revolution. The precise nature of Moertopo's relationship with Hizbullah is unclear, 
but his identification with the group was part of the public image he cultivated. 
Moertopo may have further bolstered his credentials within Darul Islam by allowing it 
to be believed he would support Indonesia becoming an Islamic State.40
In the early New Order period, Moertopo used Darul Islam elements to target 
regime enemies. Now, however, he cultivated broader Darul Islam support as part of 
his effort to engineer a Golkar victory in the general elections of July 3, 1971. This was
37 Interview with Ridwan, Bandung, July 20, 2007.
38 "Nil pernah diminta dukung Golkar," Majalah Darul Islam, no. 10, April-May, 2001, p. 38.
39 Interview with Ridwan by A1 Chaidar, October 8,1999.
40 Cahyono, Pangkopkamtib Jenderal Soemitro, p. 195.
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considered something of a challenge. Many in the government, including Moertopo, 
were pessimistic about Golkar's prospects, given its lack of a support base and the 
presence of strong opposition in the form of the traditionalist Muslim organization 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, Revival of the Religious Scholars). Central to Golkar's 
campaign was a Moertopo stratagem to erode the NU vote by establishing a Golkar- 
affiliated group that would appeal directly to NU's traditionalist Muslim constituency. 
The appropriate vehicle was found in the somewhat obscure Islamic Education 
Advancement League (GUPPI, Gabungan Usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam), an 
association formed in 1950 in West Java to foster pesantren education. In the early 
1970s, under the guidance of close Moertopo associate, Soedjono Hoemardani, GUPPI 
went from being a moribund collaboration of several West Java pesantren to a Jakarta- 
based, nationwide network led by K. H. Sjarifuddin Mohammad Amin, an NU- 
affiliated chairman of the religious education directorate in the Department of 
Religious Affairs.
In mid-1970, Pitut Suharto was tasked to coopt Muslims into GUPPI. This 
operation—notable for the large financial rewards it offered and the fact that it 
targeted, inter alios, Darul Islam—is documented in a detailed study by Indonesian 
researcher Heru Cahyono. Cahyono reveals that large sums of money were made 
available through the Opsus network as inducements to join GUPPI. Based on an 
interview with GUPPI chairman, Sjarifuddin, Cahyono describes how some of the 
most influential kyai (scholar-teachers) were bought off. K. H. Tarmudzim, a kyai from 
East Java who ran a multitude of schools, initially declined to support Golkar; he 
reversed his position, however, after GUPPI offered funding to develop his schools. 
The first tranche of aid to Tarmudzim was in the order of fifty million rupiah— 
US$128,205 at the exchange rate of the time. K. H. Ali Maksum, a kyai who ran a 
prominent pesantren of eight hundred students in Yogyakarta, received fourteen 
million rupiah. K. H. Musta'in Romly, the head of one of Java's biggest pesantren, was 
given fifty million rupiah, along with special credit from the regional government for 
the development of his pesantren,41 The business associates of Soedjono Hoemardani 
and Ali Moertopo appear to have been the sources of such largesse; both were known 
to have close connections with Japanese businessmen through the Opsus network. 
Based on interviews with GUPPI Secretary-General Djamhari and Pitut Suharto, 
Cahyono footnotes the following snapshot of GUPPI financing:
GUPPI was a very rich organization. Aside from funds received through official 
requests for government assistance, GUPPI received funds that were attained by 
Soedjono himself. [These funds] were of a large amount and greatly exceeded 
official government assistance. GUPPI was able to benefit from Soedjono's special 
relationship with Japanese investors. Aside from this, contributions could appear 
spontaneously from Soedjono's "business associates," friends, or national 
businessmen. Through the influence of the power that was so greatly associated 
with the Soedjono-Ali Moertopo duo, GUPPI could even attain assistance from 
the governor, for example, in making available transportation.42
41 Heru Cahyono, Peranan Ulama Dalam Golkar 1971-1980 (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992), pp. 102-3.
42 Ibid., pp. 120-21.
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There are fewer details regarding the recruitment of Darul Islam members, but 
Pitut Suharto concedes that this did, indeed, take place. He argues that GUPPI, while 
originally aimed at the pesantren masses and traditionalist circles, was also conceived 
as an organization to cultivate the entire Islamic community and to counter the radical 
tendencies within it. Cahyono paraphrases Pitut's rationale as follows:
In order that there not be a recurrence of the Islamic radicalism that until now has 
haunted Indonesian political history, a better approach needs to be found ... 
Therefore an Islamic organization must be cultivated that can sustain Islamic 
aspirations from the various existing streams and subsequently be led in a 
direction that is more modern.43
But GUPPI was also a Golkar-linked organization and, as such, it was one of many 
corporatist bodies designed by Moertopo to immobilize opposition to the New Order 
by forcing diverse groups into coalitions under government-controlled umbrella 
organizations. As Cahyono shows, GUPPI was under the sway of figures loyal to 
Moertopo and Soedjono who had no background in Islamic education.
Documentary evidence confirms that at least one senior Darul Islam figure— 
Hispran himself—was a member of GUPPI from the outset. He held a GUPPI 
membership card, issued by the "Central Java Consulate," fingerprinted and signed 
"H. Ismail Pranoto." Hispran's position is recorded as “pembina" (manager-trainer), 
and the date of membership is given as February 18, 1971—only weeks after GUPPI 
had been converted into a Golkar organization.44 Darul Islam might seem an obscure 
constituency to be canvassing for a general election, even if we credit it with a residual 
base of support in the hinterlands of West Java, near Garut, Tasikmalaya, and Ciamis.45 
Moertopo, however, appears to have favored a fine-grained approach to political 
engineering. He also cultivated support from other, relatively small, segments of 
society, including Catholic youth and mystical (kebatinan) groups.46
Pitut's GUPPI operation coincided with the signing of what can be regarded as the 
founding document of the Darul Islam-New Order relationship. Known as the Second 
Declaration (Ikrar Kedua), the document is a statement by four Darul Islam leaders, 
which comprised three points: (1) a reaffirmation of the first Joint Declaration and a 
pledge of loyalty to the Indonesian Republic; (2) a resolution not to enter or affiliate 
with a political party—a clause that would preclude affiliation with anyone other than 
Golkar, which was technically not considered a party; and (3) an affirmation of 
willingness to remain under the aegis of and become a force for the government.47 The 
statement is dated Bandung, October 28, 1970, and signed by Danu Mohammad 
Hasan, Hadji Zainoel Abidin, Ateng Djaelani Setiawan, and one of Kartosoewirjo's 
sons, Tahmid Rahmat Basuki. As a witness for the prosecution in the Hispran trial, 
Ateng testified that the Second Declaration was Pitut's idea and was meant to prevent 
former Darul Islam members from being drawn into party politics. But it was a
43 Ibid., p. 90.
44 Documentary evidence (item no. 20) in Hispran case.
45 Interview with Ridwan, Bandung, December 14, 2006.
46 Interview with Harry Tjan Silalahi, Jakarta, April 8, 2008.
47 Documentary evidence (item No. 6) in Hispran case.
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controversial document. Another Darul Islam leader, Adah Djaelani, described it as 
"too obsequious and overacting."48
Hispran had fewer scruples. The corollary of the Second Declaration was that 
Darul Islam members should support Golkar, the government electoral vehicle 
ostensibly above party politics, and Hispran, as part of his trial testimony, claimed that 
he did so readily. He described the process of his recruitment to Golkar in this way:
In the month of October, 1970, that is to say at the time of the Second Declaration 
done in Bandung by friends H. Danu Moh. Hasan, H. Ateng Djaelani, Abidin, 
and Tahmid, I was called to Bandung to meet these friends whom until then I 
had known by name only, and Colonel Pitut Suharto. Because Point 2 of the 
declaration prohibited the joining of a political party, it was suggested by Colonel 
Pitut Suharto [that we should] join Golkar. Because we were aware that Golkar 
aimed to fulfill the Revolution of 17 August 1945, we agreed. Then, after that, we 
returned to Brebes with the Second Declaration document, and we reported to 
KODIM [Komando Distrik Militer, District Military Command] Brebes, then we 
were invited to join Golkar in the form of GUPPI and also invited to join the 
campaign in Central Java and West Java.49
Later, Hispran described his role in GUPPI as that of preacher (mubalig). At the 
invitation of GUPPI, he preached in Brebes, Cirebon, Klaten and Solo, presumably 
urging his audience to vote Golkar.50 Even if we discount Hispran's testimony as 
information given under duress and intended to win sympathy with the court, it is 
remarkable that a figure known as one of the most diehard Darul Islam leaders had 
been coopted into a government-affiliated organization. Hispran had become 
something of a legend in Darul Islam circles, as he was perhaps the only leader to have 
neither surrendered nor been caught in 1962. Instead, he escaped Java to live for the 
rest of the 1960s in Lampung, Sumatra, where he assumed a new identity as a 
preacher.51
But Hispran's politically expedient accommodation with Golkar—like the 
accommodations made by prominent kyai—was almost certainly induced by the 
financial patronage that he and other Darul Islam leaders received. According to Ken 
Conboy, a consultant on Indonesian security affairs with direct access to intelligence 
circles, beginning in 1969 Opsus arranged for Darul Islam leaders to receive kerosene 
distribution rights in Java in return for support for Golkar. Conboy claims that Ateng 
Djaelani, the veteran Darul Islam commander who signed both Joint Declarations, was 
"ultimately placed in charge of the kerosene network allocated by Moertopo."52 Trial 
evidence indeed supports the notion that Darul Islam had become part of the Golkar 
patronage system. Hispran, in his trial, repeatedly made reference to Ateng's kerosene 
interests, as well as to the kickbacks others had received from the government: Danu 
Mohammad Hasan, in addition to his job with Opsus, was given a jeep and a driver; 
Hispran himself received building contracts for his Brebes-based company CV Sadar.
48 Haji Ismail Pranoto, court testimony in Hispran case.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Interview with Tahmid Rahmat Basuki, Malangbong, September 21, 2009.
52 Conboy, The Second Front, p. 16.
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Hispran also claimed to have received a three million rupiah grant from Danu 
Mohammad Hasan for the building of a school.53
It appears that two Darul Islam leaders had kerosene businesses. Adah Djaelani (no 
relation to Ateng), a West Java Darul Islam commander who had signed the first Joint 
Declaration in 1962 but rejected the second, was director of the kerosene distribution 
company PT Sawo l l .54 Ateng Djaelani was director of the kerosene company PT 
Satrya Purnawarman. Upon closer inspection of Ateng's case, it becomes apparent that 
it was the West Java Siliwangi Command—and not Opsus—that pioneered the 
patronage of Darul Islam. In an interrogation with the military intelligence command, 
Kopkamtib (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Operational 
Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), Ateng spoke of how he got 
started in the kerosene business.55 After signing the Joint Declaration in 1962, he 
opened two roadside stalls in Bandung. As the owner of a retail store, he was also a 
kerosene distributor. In 1963, Ateng says, "my wife and children could live simply 
from the proceeds of the stalls," he traveled to Jakarta to meet Deputy Prime Minister 
Chairul Saleh, whom he had known since 1945. He was carrying a letter from the 
Siliwangi Division commander, General Ibrahim Adjie. Ateng does not divulge the 
letter's content, but whatever it was, it appears to have been helpful. General Adjie, the 
commander who had led the defeat of Darul Islam in 1962, was known for the concern 
with which he had treated his enemy. Hiroko Horikoshi notes the rather conciliatory 
approach the government took to Darul Islam fighters in 1962 (the execution of 
Kartosoewirjo notwithstanding); most were either released immediately or given 
amnesty. "The Siliwangi," she writes, "headed by General Ibrahim Adjie, too, played 
their part by treating the surrendering soldiers with compassion."56 But in Ateng's 
case, it was more than just compassion. As a result of Adjie's patronage and the Jakarta 
meeting, he was given a share in diesel distribution rights to plantations, presumably 
in West Java. Under the New Order, Moertopo only increased such patronage, and 
Ateng's prospects continued to rise. From 1973, until the Komando Jihad affair broke 
in 1976, Ateng served as the West Java general chairman of Gapermigas, the Golkar- 
affiliated union of private oil and gas traders.
Siliwangi's relationship with Darul Islam went far beyond just Ateng Djaelani and 
involvement in the oil and gas industry. The Division had cultivated a special 
relationship with Darul Islam since its defeat of the rebellion. Under Ibrahim Adjie, the 
policy that became a Siliwangi tradition was one of patronage and indoctrination 
(called pembinaan, or "guidance") rather than punishment. Ostensibly this meant that 
not only were Darul Islam fighters reintegrated with society ideologically, but that 
financial and other support also saw them reintegrated economically. It was under this 
policy that Siliwangi intervened to reclaim the Kartosoewirjos' land in Malangbong, 
West Java, for the use of the executed leader's family. But Siliwangi's patronage 
network was challenged by Moertopo during the New Order. According to General
53 Haji Ismail Pranoto, court testimony in Hispran case.
54 Adah Djaelani, interrogation deposition in case No. 3/1983.Pid.Subv./B-13.10/Bdg, terdakwa Dodo 
Mochamad Darda bin S. M. Kartosuwiryo, Pengadilan Negeri Bandung (hereafter cited as Dodo case).
55 Ateng Djaelani, interrogation deposition in Dodo case.
56 Hiroko Horikoshi, "The Dar ul-Islam Movement in West Java (1948-62): An Experience in the Historical 
Process," Indonesia 20 (October 1975): 78.
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Soemitro (the 1973-74 Kopkamtib Commander who famously clashed with Ali 
Moertopo), rivalry emerged between Siliwangi and Opsus over control of Darul Islam 
after Opsus's entry into what was considered Siliwangi territory. Former Darul Islam 
members, he says, "at the beginning were managed by Kodam Siliwangi so that they 
would not continue the movement ... but suddenly [they were] pulled by Ali 
Moertopo to Jakarta."57 Siliwangi had no choice in the matter, and as a result, its 
relationship with Moertopo deteriorated. Such institutional rivalry would eventually 
culminate in a security scare in 1977 and the mass arrests of so-called Komando Jihad 
suspects.
In 1971, however, Moertopo could still claim that his political machinations had 
been a success. In the general election, Golkar won a landslide 62.8 percent of the vote. 
NU had been successfully contained, coming in second with 18.67 percent. The party 
Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Muslim Party of Indonesia) was devastated; it 
gained only 5.36 percent of the vote.58 Appropriately, Moertopo and his offsider Pitut 
Suharto consolidated their positions within the Golkar executive. Pitut's role was 
formalized as "secretary for spiritual matters and culture."59
Komando Jihad
Attractive, perhaps, to young radicals, the not-so-subtle name "Komando Jihad" 
had, in fact, appeared before. In 1967 the name was adopted by a coalition of Muslim 
youth organizations, led by the Muslim Students of Indonesia (Pelajar Islam Indonesia, 
PII) activist Abdul Qadir Djaelani. The Komando Jihad coalition was formed as a front 
to support the New Order in its purge of elements of the old regime. But it lasted only 
a few months and seems to have spent much of its energy fighting the ban placed on it 
by the military authorities.60 The mid-1970s saw the name recycled by a new 
generation of Darul Islam members in Medan, Sumatra—one of them the former PII 
secretary for North Sumatra. They used it to describe, variously, their organization or 
their first operation, which, either way, represented a localized revival of Darul Islam. 
Although this name was not adopted beyond the Medan group, "Komando Jihad" 
eventually caught on with the authorities during their crackdown on the Darul Islam 
revival. As this crackdown was initiated on the eve of the 1977 general election, 
however, its timing—as well as Moertopo's Machiavellian reputation—meant that 
Komando Jihad has gone down in history as a government conspiracy. Thus Damien 
Kingsbury in his Politics of Indonesia rightly observes that, "It was widely believed that 
the Komando Jihad did not actually exist, but was a fabrication by the armed forces for 
the purposes of tightening its political control."61 The government was, in fact, 
eventually prepared to admit that the label they were using was not entirely accurate. 
As Tempo magazine noted, "Komando Jihad, according to [Attorney General] Ali Said,
57 Cahyono, Pangkopkamtib Jenderal Soemitro, pp. 70-71.
58 Ken Ward, The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study (Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Monash University, 1974), p. 160.
59 Ibid., p. 181.
60 Pimpinan Pusat Komando Djihad Ummat Islam, "Dokumenta Selecta 'Komando Djihad/" Jakarta, 1967. 
My thanks to Ken Ward for making this material available.
61 Damien Kingsbury, The Politics o f Indonesia (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 118.
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is actually a term for a variety of extremist movements whose membership is led by 
former leaders of Darul Islam/Islamic Army of Indonesia."62
In 1973, these movements achieved a new level of consolidation. While the space 
for Muslim political parties shrank that year with the imposition of a two-party system 
of political opposition, the Islamic State of Indonesia had occasion to appoint its first 
imam since Kartosoewirjo. This event was the culmination of months of diplomacy. 
Several leaders, including Hispran, had traveled to Aceh to urge Daud Beureu'eh to 
consider accepting the position. Sometime in September, six key leaders met in Jakarta 
in a house on Jalan Mahoni owned by Romli Yakub, a former Darul Islam leader from 
South Sulawesi.63 Represented were the three command areas (Komando Perang 
Wilayah Besar) of Darul Islam's operations—Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Java-Madura.64 
Sumatra was represented by Gaos Taufik, Sulawesi by Ali A. T., and Java-Madura by 
Adah Djaelani. Also present were Kartosoewirjo's former bodyguard, Aceng Kurnia, 
one of Kartosoewirjo's sons, Dodo Mohammad Darda, and Daud Beureu'eh himself. 
The meeting was brief but, for Darul Islam, historic. A simple command structure was 
formed, and Daud Beureu'eh was installed as the new imam.65 After eleven years, 
Darul Islam had its first successor to Kartosoewirjo.
Yet just as the Islamic State was taking shape, it began to fracture. Two pioneers of 
the 1970s revival, Djaja Sujadi and Kadar Solihat, had from the outset resisted moves 
that would entangle Darul Islam with the New Order authorities. At the 1971 reunion 
in Bandung, for example, they had opposed Opsus sponsorship.66 Now, in 1975, they 
broke ties with the mainstream leadership and formed a breakaway group, with Djaja 
Sujadi anointing himself imam. The Sujadi faction styled itself on the doctrine of Jihad 
Fillah, connoting non-violent jihad. This was in contrast to the faction led by Adah 
Djaelani, which did not eschew violence and adhered to the traditional Darul Islam 
doctrine of Jihad Fisabilillah or "jihad in the way of God." Such a schism had been in the 
making since the defeat of Darul Islam in 1962 and centered on the involvement in the 
revival of two leaders, Ateng Djaelani and Zaenal Abidin, both of whom had 
surrendered to Republican forces before the call to do so had been made by 
Kartosoewirjo, a decision that would turn out to be controversial. In his 1977 
Kopkamtib interrogation, Ateng Djaelani gave the history of the dispute from his 
perspective.67 He reported that in 1962, "two days before Idul Fitri" and "long before S. 
M. Kartosoewirjo was caught," he had surrendered to the military in Bandung. "After 
surrendering, I, along with Zaenal Abidin, joined in helping to restore security through 
the [fence of legs] tactics of Kodam Vl/Siliwangi at the time." Then, with the revival of
62 "Mereka Minta Penjelasan," Tempo, April 18,1981. See also "Pecahnya Sesepuh DI," Tempo, September 
30,1978.
63 The information on Romli Yacob is from Gaos Taufik, found in his interrogation deposition in the 
Hispran case. On the Mahoni meeting in general, see Pikiran Rakyat, February 25,1983; and Dodo 
Mochamad Darda, interrogation deposition in Dodo case.
64 This top-level command structure is analogous to the TNI's (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian 
armed forces) Regional Defense Command (Komando Wilayah Pertahanan) structure, which was 
abandoned by the TNI in the mid-1980s.
65 Unpublished memoirs by Kang Edi, February 17, 2000, p. 3.
66 ICG, Recycling Militants, p. 4.
67 Ateng Djaelani, interrogation deposition in Dodo case. All quotations from Ateng in this paragraph 
derive from this source.
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Darul Islam, rumors began to circulate that those who had surrendered before 
Kartosoewirjo had done so were to be considered impure or “mustamal leaders." Ateng 
explained that “mustamal" (from the Arabic for "used") "means water that has already 
been used for wudu [ablutions], thus cannot be used for wudu again." But those who 
had surrendered after Kartosoewirjo issued the command to do so remained pure and 
thus suitable for leadership positions. Among those who held this opinion was Djaja 
Sujadi.
But Adah Djaelani disagreed. With an eye to the position of imam, in September 
1975 he called five leaders to a Meeting of Elders (Pertemuan Sesepuh) in Bandung. 
There he allocated positions of authority, or at least rankings, in the following order of 
seniority: (I) Adah Djaelani, (II) Danu Mohammad Hasan, (III) Ateng Djaelani, (IV) 
Zaenal Abidin, (V) Haji Ismail Pranoto.68
Adah Djaelani saw the grouping as a kind of civilian command independent from 
the authority of the Darul Islam military but also, perhaps, as a precursor to an 
imamate council or cabinet.69 According to Ateng, Adah's main motive was to generate 
support for himself in opposition to the Sujadi faction. It is unclear whether the elders 
had any operational role; still, the grouping is indicative of the perceived relative 
seniority of key Darul Islam leaders in the lead up to the Komando Jihad arrests.70 It is 
also indicative of the nebulous nature of Darul Islam's state-building. Adah's gambit 
created confusion as to whether the new grouping was informal or was, in fact, an 
official cabinet, with each of the five members responsible for particular portfolios. 
Hispran, who arrived late in Bandung, missed the meeting. He was told of its outcome 
by Ateng, who said that Adah Djaelani had been made prime minister, Danu 
Mohammad Hasan was now responsible for Darul Islam veterans, and Ateng himself 
had been named minister for internal affairs. Hispran was told he had been made 
responsible for communications for West and Central Java. But Hispran so doubted the 
legitimacy of the cabinet that in November 1975 he traveled to Aceh to consult with 
Imam Daud Beureu'eh. Beureu'eh, it transpired, was unaware of Adah Djaelani's 
initiative.71
Despite a confused and segmented organizational structure, Darul Islam members 
continued to reconsolidate the Islamic State. In December 1975, a meeting was called at 
the house of Danu Mohammad Hasan to receive Gaos Taufik from Sumatra. There 
Taufik, acting as envoy for Daud Beureu'eh, delivered a written order by Beureu'eh, 
acting as imam, to form a fighting front, or Barisan fi Sabilillah. Ateng Djaelani, who 
read the letter, described the order as one that called for the organization to
... immediately form a Barisan fi Sabilillah in accordance with the Islamic State of 
Indonesia statement No. 1/KPSI, complete with personnel. In hope that God 
Almighty blesses all our efforts towards the ideal of victory for the Islamic State 
of Indonesia.72
68 Haji Ismail Pranoto, court testimony in Hispran case.
69 Adah Djaelani, interrogation deposition in Dodo case.
70 Ibid.
71 Haji Ismail Pranoto, interrogation deposition in Hispran case. Gaos Taufik, the organizer of Hispran's 
meeting with Beureu'eh, was also unaware of the appointments.
72 Ateng Djaelani, interrogation deposition in Dodo case.
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As this action would only formalize the state-building efforts already quietly 
underway for months, it perhaps represented a move by Beur'euh to reassert his 
authority over Adah Djaelani and the Java leaders. Mirroring the Indonesian military's 
territorial command structure, Java-based Darul Islam leaders had been installing 
commanders and other representatives into the Islamic State hierarchy at various 
levels. In 1976, the tempo of state-building quickened. Danu Mohammad Hasan 
spurred these efforts by claiming that Ali Moertopo was supporting them and would 
provide weapons for troops if Darul Islam first organized its personnel. Ridwan has 
recalled they were told "what's important is that we prepare the organizational 
structure as fully as possible."73 Court documents give a fairly consistent, if 
fragmentary, picture of the command structure established during this period. At the 
top was Daud Beureu'eh as imam and all-Indonesia Military Commander (Komandan 
Perang Seluruh Indonesia, KPSI). The top territorial command level was the Greater 
Region War Command (Komando Perang Wilayah Besar, KPWB), consisting of Java 
(and Madura), Sulawesi, and Sumatra. The most complete picture we have of the 
command hierarchy is for the Java area (known as KPWB I), as this is where the 1976 
reorganizing was focused, to the relative neglect of Sulawesi (KPWB II) and Sumatra 
(KPWB III). The Commander (Panglima) of Java was Danu Mohammad Hasan. The 
Deputy Commander was Hispran. At the provincial level were nine Regional 
Commands (Komandan Wilayah, KW). Not all the names of the regional commanders 
are known, and it is likely that not all of the positions were filled. Positions had been 
filled, however, in Central and East Java, the two provinces that saw most of the 
reorganizing activity. The commander for Central Java (KW II) was Hispran. His 
deputy was a new recruit with a background in Hizbullah, Haji Faleh. Hispran also 
recruited the commander for East Java (KW III), Syamsudin.74
In Central and East Java, Hispran attempted to establish the Islamic State structure 
at all levels below the provincial. Representatives or commanders were sought for the 
district (kabupaten), subdistrict (kecamatan), and village (desa). He often delegated the 
task of inducting recruits at these levels to his subordinates. Most new recruits, 
however, appear to have been sent to be formally inducted at Danu Mohammad 
Hasan's house in Bandung, which was typically referred to as the "center" (pusat).75 
For monitoring purposes, the highly centralized nature of the Islamic State must have 
been a great advantage to Opsus; according to Ridwan, if a meeting was a "central 
meeting" (pertemuan pusat), it had to be at Danu Mohammad Hasan's house.76 There, 
often in the presence of Hispran and other Darul Islam leaders, recruits would recite an 
oath (bai'at), which required, inter alia, that they
... defend the existence of the Islamic State of Indonesia in order that Islamic Law
applies comprehensively and most broadly among the Islamic Community of the
Indonesian Nation in Indonesia.77
73 Interview with Ridwan, Bandung, December 14, 2006.
74 This information is from Surat Dakwaan [Indictment] in Dodo case; and Haji Ismail Pranoto, 
interrogation deposition in Hispran case.
75 Haji Ismail Pranoto, interrogation deposition in Hispran case; and Moch. Syamsudin Marzuki, 
interrogation deposition in Hispran case.
76 Interview with Ridwan, Bandung, December 14, 2006.
77 Documentary evidence (item no. 2) in Hispran case.
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Under interrogation, Dodo Muhammad Darda recounted numerous visits by new 
recruits from Central and East Java to Danu's house for induction.78 During his 
interrogation, Hispran was asked why East Java was the focus of the recruitment drive. 
He responded that it was because of the strength of Islam in East Java, the 
concentration of former Hizbullah and Sabilillah fighters in that region, and the 
relatively high number of pesantren compared to that in West Java.79
There are indications, however, that the drive was only a partial success before it 
was halted by the arrests of Hispran and colleagues. Hispran described being rejected 
several times by teachers he approached, who preferred to focus on their pesantren or 
university tasks rather than become involved with Darul Islam. He did admit, 
however, that he had success in the town of Kudus. There, in July 1976, he installed six 
men to form the Central Java leadership, including Haji Faleh, his future deputy 
commander for Central Java. All these leaders were required to report their activities to 
the "center."80 One development is significant, in part, by its absence from the record: 
Hispran fails to mention that in December he succeeded in recruiting two pesantren 
teachers in Solo, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.81 These two men would 
later come to prominence for their role in founding Jemaah Islamiyah, a development 
to which we will return.
Outside Java the only significant Darul Islam revival was in Sumatra. There Gaos 
Taufik had recruited a small group of young men for an operation that they called 
Komando Jihad. Darul Islam members outside Sumatra did not recognize this name 
when they were later labeled with it by the authorities, but in interrogations for the 
Hispran trial in 1978, Taufik and his followers spoke frequently of Komando Jihad. 
Hispran and his followers, by contrast, preferred to use other terms for their 
operations, such as "Barisan fi Sabilillah" and "Jemaah Mujahidin." In his unpublished 
memoirs, written in 2000, West Javanese Darul Islam leader Kang Edi uses the term 
"Komando Jihad" and categorically rejects the accusation that the operation was the 
product of government manipulation:
The Komando Jihad incident is often said to be [the result of] a manipulation by 
Ali Moertopo. At the meeting between Gaos Taufik and Danu Mohammad 
Hasan, there was an agreement to organize a revolution under the order of the 
second Imam of the Islamic State of Indonesia. So there was no involvement by 
Ali Moertopo in the Komando Jihad movement in Sumatra.82
78 Dodo Mochamad Darda, interrogation deposition in Dodo case.
79 Haji Ismail Pranoto, interrogation deposition in Hispran case.
80 Ibid.
81 Sungkar and Ba'asyir later confessed under interrogation to having been inducted by Hispran, but in 
their joint trial in 1982 they recanted, claiming their confession had been given under duress. They claimed 
that Hispran was a visitor to their pesantren but that they did not swear an oath to him or collaborate with 
him in any other way. See Abdullah bin Achmad Sungkar and Abu Bakar Basyir bin Abud Ba'asyir, court 
testimony in case No.l / Pid.Subv. /1982/ P.N.Skh., Pengadilan Negeri Sukoharjo (hereafter cited as 
Sungkar and Ba'asyir case). But in a deposition for the same trial, Hispran stated that he did indeed induct 
Sungkar and Ba'asyir into the Islamic State of Indonesia. Hispran confirmed this statement at the time to 
his friend in prison, Umar Abduh. Interview with Umar Abduh, Jakarta, July 24, 2007.
82 Unpublished memoirs by Kang Edi, February 17, 2000, p. 17.
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Taufik had started recruiting a new following in the early 1970s. Among those he 
inducted into Darul Islam who had no family background in the movement was 
Timsar Zubil. The two had met at the Medan office of the PII in 1967, the year that PII 
had become drawn into Abdul Qadir Djaelani's Komando Jihad coalition. Timsar was 
the North Sumatra secretary of the PII before being drawn closer to Taufik and Darul 
Islam. Taufik tasked him to recruit a force to carry out acts of sabotage, which he later 
described as "shock therapy" for a dissolute New Order society.83 By 1975, Komando 
Jihad had taken shape. It consisted of eight men, including Timsar, under the 
command of an elder member, Agus Sulaeman. With the agreement of Taufik, in early 
1975 six of the men traveled to Jakarta to attend a fifteen-day crash course in bomb­
making at the home of a Darul Islam veteran from Sulawesi, arranged by Ali A. T. On 
his return to Medan, Timsar Zubil was able to procure explosives from Abdul Qadir 
Baraja, a Darul Islam veteran based in Lampung.84
In September 1975, Komando Jihad preparations went international. A two-man 
delegation of Rifai Ahmad (the Lampung representative of Hispran's company, CV 
Sadar) and Dainuri Saleh was sent to Malaysia to request support from the Libyan 
embassy.85 It was followed separately by Daud Beureu'eh, who carried a letter in 
Arabic addressed to Libyan president Muammar Qaddafi. According to Dainuri Saleh, 
the letter, conceived by Gaos Taufik but signed by Daud Beureu'eh as imam, referred 
to the "DI/TII struggle since 1949 until now to uphold the establishment of Islamic 
Law and the Islamic State of Indonesia." Its focus was a request for "material and 
financial aid, especially firearms."86 Rifai Ahmad later testified that they had hoped for 
300,000 modern weapons, valued at US $12 billion—a loan that was to have been 
repaid, of course, but only "after the Islamic State of Indonesia had gained 
independence through destroying the communists."87 The success of the mission 
apparently hinged on the cooperation of Daud Beureu'eh's Malaysian grandson-in- 
law, Sanusi Juned, a London-educated banker and prominent activist in the United 
Malays National Organization (UMNO), who later became minister for agriculture in 
the Mahathir government. But at a meeting in a mosque in Penang, Juned rejected the 
Darul Islam delegation's requests. He said that certain conditions for such aid were not 
yet satisfied, one of which was violent upheaval (pergolokan) in Indonesia. Dainuri 
Saleh said that, on returning to Sumatra, he reported to Gaos Taufik that the mission 
had been unsuccessful. Taufik told him to be patient. Around this time Dainuri Saleh 
also crossed paths with Hispran, who was returning from his meeting with Daud 
Beureu'eh in Aceh. Hispran, too, counseled patience.88
But the Komando Jihad recruits were eager for action. First, to accumulate funds, 
they robbed a number of businesses in Sumatra. Then followed acts of sabotage. In 
June 1976, Anwar Jeri, the Komando Jihad member who had hosted Hispran in Medan, 
was ordered to throw a grenade during a Qur'an reading competition in North 
Sumatra. The aim, he said, was to create tension between the Muslim and Christian
83 Interview with Timsar Zubil, Jakarta, November 25, 2006.
84 Timsar Zubil, interrogation deposition in Hispran case.
85 On Rifai Ahmad see Haji Ismail Pranoto, interrogation deposition in Hispran case.
86 Dainuri Saleh, interrogation deposition in Hispran case.
87 "Saksi Rivai Ahmad Ungkapkan Minta Bantuan Senjata Libia," Pikiran Rakyat, January 18,1978.
88 Dainuri Saleh, interrogation deposition in Hispran case.
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communities. But the grenade failed to detonate.89 Next came a series of Komando 
Jihad bombing operations in North and West Sumatra. Timsar Zubil distributed 
explosives to members in pairs, and then he and a partner traveled to West Sumatra 
and placed time bombs in the Immanuel Hospital, a Baptist hospital in Bukittinggi, 
and in the Nurul Iman mosque in Padang.90The Immanuel bomb, however, also failed 
to detonate and was discovered by hospital staff.91 The mosque bomb exploded on 
November 11, damaging the building but claiming no casualties.92 On Christmas Day, 
synchronized bombings were carried out in Medan. The targets were two churches 
(one Methodist, the other Catholic), a cinema, and a bar. It is unclear whether there 
were any casualties in these attacks. Timsar Zubil claims that they were designed not 
to harm anyone, but to shock the government into action against the growth of sinful 
behavior during the New Order.93 Yet the selection of targets and the timing of the 
attacks suggest these operations were also designed to provoke inter-religious conflict.
Around the time of the Komando Jihad operations, and perhaps in part because of 
them, the military's territorial command in Java was beginning to fear that Darul Islam 
had grown out of control. Siliwangi commander Himawan Soetanto had been 
informed by military intelligence of suspicious movements by Hispran and other 
former Darul Islam fighters. Concerned that a revitalized Darul Islam would threaten 
the security of the 1977 election, on November 1, 1976, Soetanto called a meeting of 
Darul Islam members at the Siliwangi headquarters to remind them of their 
commitments under the 1962 Joint Declaration. The effort was one of "guidance" 
(pembinaan), Soetanto says, "so that they would not make a return to extremism."94 He 
was surprised at how well the meeting was attended, taking it as proof that Darul 
Islam still existed as a community. He was also surprised by the attendance of Hispran 
himself. According to Soetanto, Hispran was known as one of the more aggressive 
Darul Islam veterans, yet he attended the meeting openly and denied he had been 
doing anything wrong.
Hispran left the Siliwangi headquarters a free man, but he did not stay that way for 
long. Unknown to him, the two original "traitors" of the movement, Ateng Djaelani 
and Zaenal Abidin, were about to carry out one final betrayal. About a week after the 
Siliwangi meeting, Ateng Djaelani mustered the courage to report the revival of Darul 
Islam to the Siliwangi Command. In an interrogation, Ateng described the moment as 
follows:
At the opportunity to meet on about 7 or 8 November 1976 with Mr. W. R.
Samallo [First Assistant Kodam Siliwangi] and also at the opportunity to meet
personally with the Kodam Siliwangi Commander [Himawan Soetanto] at
89 Anwar Jeri, interrogation deposition in Hispran case.
90 Timsar Zubil, interrogation deposition in Hispran case file; and Dainuri Saleh, interrogation deposition 
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Siliwangi headquarters, at the time it was as if my throat were blocked ... At the 
time I could only report in my own words, more or less, the following: "Bapak 
Commander, among ex-DI/TII [Darul Islam/Islamic Army of Indonesia] leaders 
no one is made into a cult [dikultuskan], and each has his own particular 
influence, so, for example, if Danu Mohammad Hasan does something to harm 
the state, it would not be followed by the ex-DI/TII who are under the influence 
of myself or others. So the foolish ones would be Danu Mohammad Hasan and a 
few of his followers alone."95
For Ridwan, whose understanding of the event is consistent with Ateng's, this was 
treason of the highest order. By that time, he says, Darul Islam had a new structure in 
place throughout Java, and Ateng Djaelani and Zaenal Abidin revealed it all to Kodam 
Siliwangi. "It was they who exposed the secret that Darul Islam was going to reactivate 
... and later everyone was arrested."96 On January 8 the following year, Hispran was 
arrested in East Java after one of his prospective recruits, a member of the mainstream 
Islamic party PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, the Unity Development Party), 
informed the authorities of his whereabouts.97 On January 17, Timsar Zubil was 
arrested in Medan. In early February, the chief of Kopkamtib, Admiral Sudomo, 
announced to the nation that several members of a movement calling itself Komando 
Jihad had been arrested in Sumatra, Jakarta, West Java, and East Java.98 By June, 
Sudomo could report that seven hundred such arrests had been made.99
In the case of Hispran, perhaps the most high-profile of the arrests, the record 
suggests that his interrogators (a public prosecutor and an officer of Kopkamtib) were 
surprised and somewhat captivated by the specter of Darul Islam and what they
referred to as its "shadow state" (negara bayangari). For not only had the Islamic State 
modeled the Republic's flag and constitution, it had also imitated other appurtenances 
of the Republic, notably the army's territorial command structure. Thus one exchange 
between Hispran and his interrogators went as follows:
Is it true that with the formation of tools or instruments that represent a body or 
institution, that is to say, a Prime Minister ... Internal Affairs Minister ... Chief of 
the Java and Madura Command ... along with your formation of the leadership 
for Commands in the areas of Kediri and Bojonegoro, along with District 
Commands in Lamongan, Tuban, Nganjuk, Blitar ... that it means an already 
established Shadow State, the Islamic State of Indonesia?
[Hispran:] Yes, that's correct.
In other words, established a State within a State?
[Hispran:] Yes, that's correct.100
95 Ateng Djaelani, interrogation deposition in Dodo case.
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What Was Komando Jihad?
Occurring just prior to the May 2, 1977 general election, the government 
crackdown on Muslim "extremists" immediately generated suspicion in the Muslim 
community. In a post-election article, Tempo reported the complaint of PPP youth 
leader Husni Thamrin that his party had been disadvantaged by news that Hispran 
had been recruiting PPP members into Darul Islam. Darul Islam, he said, should not be 
characterized as the "hereditary sin" of the Muslim community. Bung Tomo, the iconic 
youth leader of the revolution, went even further. He published a pamphlet describing 
Komando Jihad as a government "creation," a means of applying pressure "so that the 
Islamic community can never gain more votes than Golkar." He singled out for blame 
Minister for Defense and Security General Panggabean and Kopkamtib Chief Admiral 
Sudomo as "Christians who currently hold power."101
Although the revelations of the existence of a resurgent Darul Islam may indeed 
have been exploited by the New Order to discredit political Islam, the timing and 
tempo of the revival, as we have seen, was set by Darul Islam itself. The evidence 
suggests that it was only on the approach to the 1977 election that the authorities 
judged that Opsus had lost control of the movement. Perhaps contributing to this 
judgment were indications that the movement had shifted its support from Golkar to 
the PPP.102 In early 1977, before the start of the arrests and in an apparent effort to 
reassert control, Pitut Suharto called on ten Darul Islam notables based in Bandung to 
sign another joint declaration expressing support for the government and, in addition, 
for Golkar. This time, however, he met with strong resistance and demands for 
government compensation in return for signatures. According to Ateng Djaelani, he 
and Zaenal Abidin agreed to sign immediately, but the others, including Adah 
Djaelani and Danu Mohammad Hasan, initially refused. On January 16, 1977, the 
prospective signatories met with Pitut at the Bakin mess located on Jalan Sukawangi, 
Bandung. During a long and heated negotiation, Adah insisted that they would sign 
the declaration only if they received political, military, and economic aid. He requested 
that Pitut sign a formal statement promising as much, but Pitut refused to make any 
concrete commitment. Instead, he offered a personal letter addressed to Adah that 
requested the names of Kartosoewirjo family members who needed assistance, the 
names of children of Darul Islam members who needed schooling, and the names of 
two persons who could be supported as candidates for the national parliament (DPR, 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Representative Assembly) and two for the 
provincial parliament. With that offer, everyone present was willing to sign what was 
the third joint declaration by Darul Islam made at the behest of the government.103
By this time, Pitut must have realized, if he were not aware earlier, that he was 
dealing with an emboldened and much less tractable movement than heretofore. 
Perhaps to redress this situation, the declaration consisted of three points that were 
much more explicit in expressing the signatories' obedience to the government than 
the three points of the previous joint declaration; and there was no reference to Darul
101 "Bung Tomo, DI dan Abri," Tempo, November 19,1977.
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Islam as a "force" that might act in concert with the government. The three points 
were: (1) an expression of gratitude to the New Order government for the presidential 
decree that permitted ex-Darul Islam and ex-PRRI/Permesta rebels to take part in the 
1977 election; (2) an expression of continued support for President Suharto, the 1945 
constitution, and the philosophy of Pancasila, along with support for a Golkar victory 
in the 1977 election; and (3) an agreement to call on all ex-Darul Islam members to 
resist being influenced by those who "still dream of establishing an Islamic State of 
Indonesia."104 The declaration, however, could not save even its signatories from the 
mass arrests that were already underway. Some, like Danu Mohammad Hasan, were 
arrested relatively early. Others, such as Adah Djaelani, went on the run, evading 
arrest for a few more years. When Adah was put on trial in Jakarta in 1983, the 
Bandung newspaper Pikiran Rakyat led with the front page headline, "Defendant 
Offered DPR/MPR Membership?" Adah Djaelani had revealed in court he had been 
made such an offer by "a colonel from a government organization. But the offer was 
not able to be taken up because the defendant was on the run from the authorities."105
At the time, the government did, at least once, publicly concede that its intelligence 
service had maintained a relationship with Darul Islam and that this had spiraled out 
of control. In 1981—amid continuing controversy over the Komando Jihad arrests— 
Kopkamtib Commander Admiral Sudomo met with prominent ulama in order to mend 
relations with the Muslim community and dampen suspicions of a government 
conspiracy against Islam. He admitted that "several ex-DI/TII leaders in 1971 were 
indeed managed by Bakin." The aim of that earlier alliance, he added, was connected 
to the election—a reference to Darul Islam's recruitment to the cause of Golkar. "But if 
you look at their behavior in 1976, it is clear that it was out of hand and unknown to 
Bakin."106
Popular suspicion of Komando Jihad has persisted, however, which is not 
surprising given the involvement of Ali Moertopo, a figure who earned a reputation 
for Machiavellian operations in Papua in 1962 and East Timor in 1975.107 Nevertheless, 
the theory that Komando Jihad in some way represented a "sting operation" by 
Moertopo to entrap Muslims and discredit political Islam is inconsistent with the 
circumstances of the Opsus-Darul Islam relationship, the circumstances of the 
government crackdown, and the facts of who gained and who lost as a result of the 
affair.
Opsus approached Darul Islam, as we have seen, to garner support for Golkar. For 
his part, General Soemitro disagreed with Moertopo's methods, but he, too, saw the 
need to engineer elections and capture Muslim constituencies. In a 1981 interview with 
David Jenkins, he said, "If you had left it to Golkar in 1971, without any interference by 
ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of the Republic of 
Indonesia), the Muslim parties would have won. I can assure you of that! Oh yes!
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Seventy one! Seventy seven! Without the help of ABRI, PPP would have won. And 
won a majority!"108
But this is only half the story. Since Danu Mohammad Hasan played his early role 
in targeting Sukarno regime officials, Darul Islam had probably been cultivated by the 
Indonesian government for its propensity to be turned to subversive purposes. This 
capacity would have been attractive to Moertopo, who appears to have developed a 
network of subversives, preman (thugs), and other compromised individuals, the 
primary use of which was to engineer Golkar election victories.109 It is unclear how 
Darul Islam elements might have been operationally involved in such engineering, if 
they were at all. It is clear, however, that Danu Mohammad Hasan and other Darul 
Islam figures were part of an array of Opsus agents, including GUPPI officers and 
-preman, that was used to provoke the so-called Malari riots of January 15,1974, in order 
to discredit Moertopo's rival, Kopkamtib Chief General Soemitro.110 Thus, the Opsus- 
Darul Islam relationship can be characterized as one involving patronage offered in 
return for services to Moertopo, whether these services included canvassing votes for 
Golkar or more clandestine activities. This relationship was inconsistent with a sting 
operation because it meant that Opsus commanded influence over Darul Islam overtly 
rather than covertly. In 1971, Pitut Suharto attended the Darul Islam reunion quite 
openly. Everyone there knew who he was and what he wanted: Darul Islam support 
for Golkar.
The circumstances of the government crackdown on the Darul Islam revival also 
do not support the theory that this was a sting operation. The arrests of Darul Islam 
members were directed by Kopkamtib and the military's territorial command in 
opposition to Ali Moertopo; indeed, Moertopo, far from being responsible for the 
crackdown, was its indirect target. His cultivation of Darul Islam had always been a 
controversial strategy, initially creating conflict with the Siliwangi Command. It was 
also a strategy he conducted in defiance of his immediate superior, the chief of Bakin 
until 1974, Sutopo Yuwono. Reflecting on Moertopo's use of Darul Islam, Yuwono has 
said, "Back then I forbade it because the risk was large, primarily for Islam ... The 
phrase I used back then was 'who is using whom?' Because I was not convinced that 
they [Darul Islam] had let go of their ideas, the risk was always there."111 But Moertopo 
was so close to Suharto that he could defy Yuwono's instructions. "If Ali did it, he 
didn't do it in the name of Bakin, but independently as Spri [Sekretaris Pribadi, private 
secretary to the president]. From his actions it was clear that he didn't follow me 
anymore, that was my problem," explained Yuwono.112
Eventually Java's regional military commanders also turned against Moertopo. The 
Siliwangi commander at the time, Himawan Soetanto, has said that, in the lead-up to
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the election, the commanders of West, Central, and East Java were in agreement that 
Ali Moertopo's cultivation of Darul Islam was a threat to stability in their regions.113 
According to General Soemitro, East Java Commander Witarmin was so angry at 
Pitut's Darul Islam activities that "they say he wanted to shoot Pitut."114 Aware of the 
threat, Pitut laid low for a few weeks in Jakarta. On March 11, 1977, the Java 
commanders confronted Moertopo directly. Himawan recalled the moment in this way 
for Ken Conboy:
We were all concerned about his acquiescence to let Komando Jihad grow 
unchecked in our regions. Ali Moertopo told us not to worry. He said that he was 
letting them think they were a bulwark against communism, but was really using 
them for votes. Komando Jihad, meanwhile, was telling Ali Moertopo that they 
would guard against communism, but they were really using the opportunity to 
organize themselves. He [Moertopo] was overly confident and assured us he 
could control them. It came down to a game of who was playing whom.115
Himawan further recalled that Moertopo was angry at being questioned over Darul 
Islam.116 We can assume he was less than happy, also, when the regional military 
command began arresting Pitut's Darul Islam contacts.
For his part, Ridwan does not suspect the involvement of Opsus in the arrest of 
himself and his colleagues, and he has acknowledged that the arrests were carried out 
by Kopkamtib. Ultimately, he has said, only God knows whether Moertopo was a 
protector of Darul Islam or a traitor. But he has insisted that "there has never been a 
Darul Islam movement exposed because of Pitut Suharto."117
Finally, if the image of Moertopo as the mastermind of Komando Jihad were 
accurate, one might expect to see him rewarded for his success: diehard Muslim 
radicals had been unearthed and arrested without an outbreak of major violence and 
the timing of the arrests served as a blow to the electoral prospects of the Muslim PPP 
party, to the advantage of Golkar. But there was never any attempt by Moertopo to 
claim the affair as a success. Meanwhile, the public was left with the impression of 
Moertopo as a dubious operator who had engaged in a conspiracy against Islam. In the 
trials of Darul Islam suspects, there were frequent embarrassing accounts, reported in 
the press, of the patronage relationship between the defendants and Ali Moertopo or 
his intelligence organization.118 Several defendants, including Dodo Muhammad 
Darda, Ridwan, and Hispran, attempted to call Pitut Suharto and Ali Moertopo as 
witnesses.119 Such requests were always rejected. Hispran's defense council described 
these absent key witnesses as "the men who knew too much."120 Quite naturally, then,
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Aloysius Sugiyanto was eager, when interviewed, to disown Opsus's dealings with 
Darul Islam as a rogue operation directed by Pitut Suharto. "It was Pitut alone," he 
complained, "who ruined the image of Opsus."121
The affair also had negative consequences for Opsus informant Danu Mohammad 
Hasan. Of all Darul Islam suspects, Danu took perhaps the heaviest fall. Despite his 
claim to be an employee of Bakin, he was arrested and tried just as Hispran had been 
before him. At his trial, he protested when his occupation was given as "farmer," 
insisting that he was a member of Bakin, but he could offer no evidence to confirm his 
membership. He was convicted and jailed anyway. Years later, on the first day of his 
release from prison, Danu died a sudden death at home in circumstances that his 
family continue to regard as suspicious.122
By contrast, the two Darul Islam leaders who informed for Siliwangi, Ateng 
Djaelani and Zaenal Abidin, escaped prosecution. As described earlier, at several trials 
Ateng Djaelani appeared as the star witness for the prosecution. When the judge at the 
Hispran trial asked him his "status," Ateng replied that he was "under watch, but still 
employed in the interests of national security."123 He did not identify his employer, but 
other reports make it clear that Ateng was a Siliwangi "asset" who was prepared to 
testify to the Darul Islam revival in a way that was critical of Moertopo's role. In the 
same article that reports Bung Tomo's critique of Komando Jihad, Tempo describes how 
Himawan Soetanto responded by presenting to the media "live witnesses" Ateng 
Djaelani and Zaenal Abidin. In a brief profile, Ateng, who is described as a supporter 
of Golkar, but one not afraid to criticize the government, is quoted as stating: "I have 
criticized the government because there was a former DI/TII leader who was managed 
by Bakin. In fact, this leader who was managed was one of those who returned to the 
forest." The leader is identified as Danu Mohammad Hasan.124
Whatever the private motives of Moertopo, we can conclude that his relationship 
with Darul Islam did not have the characteristics of a sting operation, that the 
government crackdown was not executed as part of a sting operation, and that 
Moertopo did not claim—much less receive—any credit for such an operation. Rather, 
the expedient alliance was typical of many New Order-style patron-client 
relationships; in this case, however, the patron was ultimately unable to control the 
client.
Moertopo had taken an obvious risk in cultivating a group that had traditionally 
expressed such an entrenched ideological opposition to the Indonesian Republic. He 
may have heightened that risk by conveying the impression that he would support the 
establishment of an Islamic state and would provide weapons to Darul Islam fighters. 
Such fancies may also have been the currency of Danu Mohammad Hasan, since he 
was in the invidious position of having to please both sides. In any case, Moertopo's 
use of Darul Islam backfired, an example of what in intelligence jargon is called 
"blowback"—the unintended negative consequences of covert intelligence operations. 
Since the late 1950s, Darul Islam had been a guerrilla force never fully demobilized, its
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members never properly assimilated back into society, thus posing a minor 
sociological problem. When the Siliwangi Division offered to provide Darul Islam 
veterans with financial support and employment opportunities, this represented an 
effort to solve the problem. The Opsus approach, however, which involved selling 
hopes that an Islamic state would be established and allowing Darul Islam's 
reconsolidation to go unchecked, was counterproductive to both demobilization and 
assimilation.
For their part, Ridwan, Timsar Zubil, and other Darul Islam figures have insisted 
that, despite their earlier protestations at trial, they had used their relationship with the 
government as cover for reviving the Islamic State of Indonesia. Although they 
defended themselves by claiming that they were engaged in "monitoring 
communism," in fact their vaunted anti-communism was only the pretext for a 
mutually exploitative relationship with Moertopo. According to Ridwan, this was a 
pretext deployed by Danu Mohammad Hasan, but created by Moertopo himself, who 
is supposed to have said, "ideology must be opposed by ideology," and thus "only 
Darul Islam can fight communist ideology." But Ridwan has claimed that anti­
communism was never the reason why he, Hispran, and others took up the fight again. 
It was only later, he said, that "it [anti-communism] was used at trial as a weapon to 
mitigate [the sentence]," thus it was a "formality at the trial only ... in order that the 
movement be seen as legal."125 Timsar Zubil corroborates this account. He dismisses 
the anti-communism defense as "only diplomacy."126
The Komando Jihad affair appears to mark the beginning of Moertopo's decline. In 
March 1978, he was made minister of information, a move that General Soemitro had 
suggested to Suharto years earlier as a way of controlling Moertopo by giving him a 
portfolio with clearly defined responsibilities.127 Meanwhile, key Opsus operatives, 
including Pitut Suharto, left Bakin.128 Pitut maintained his close relationship with 
Moertopo, serving as his assistant in the ministry, where he coedited a twenty-four 
volume collection of Indonesia's early nationalist literature.129 Moertopo's replacement 
as Bakin deputy chief was Major General Benny Moerdani. Moerdani was the first 
person to whom Himawan Soetanto had taken his complaint about Ali Moertopo and 
Darul Islam; together, Soetanto has said, they then raised the issue with Moertopo.130 
From his position in Bakin, Moerdani went on to dominate both the civilian and 
military intelligence fields, and, observes Richard Tanter, "the place of Opsus cowboy- 
style operations was displaced by equally ruthless but more bureaucratically organized 
[military intelligence] type operations."131 Moerdani became chief of the armed forces in 
1983, the year that Moertopo was dismissed as information minister. Moertopo, 
thoroughly overshadowed by Moerdani, died the following year.
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Darul Islam, of course, outlived Moertopo and may outlive us all. For, as suggested 
at the outset, rather than being a delimited, unified movement, it represents a 
community of radical Muslims, sustained by subsequent generations, which has 
spawned and may continue to spawn a variety of radical movements. It is, in a sense, a 
nation. Nations, however unlikely, can be remarkably persistent, as the periodic 
emergence of activists in eastern Indonesia under the flag of the "Republic of the South 
Moluccas" sometimes reminds us. Moreover, the revival of Darul Islam in the 1970s 
gave the movement momentum into the following decades. In the 1970s, inter-island 
connections were reestablished between Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi, and a new 
generation was inducted into the community. The government crackdown and the 
sense of betrayal that went with it led to cycles of revenge, more crackdowns, and 
more martyrs for the Islamic State. The Islamic State of Indonesia may have been in 
disarray at this time, but it lived on in the imagination of its "citizens."
Returning to the Community
From the outset, the continued existence of the Islamic State has been the central 
premise of Darul Islam, and a premise often taken for granted. But after the failure of 
the revival, a new generation of leaders brought into question its inherently state-based 
organizational model. The 1980s saw the emergence of a new form of Muslim activism, 
based on small study circles called usroh, inspired by the name for the organizational 
cells of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. This new approach to organizing was 
relatively more secretive and less overtly confrontational towards the secular state. It 
emphasized dakwah: religious outreach and proselytizing. Insofar as they attracted 
Darul Islam members, the new usroh movements represented a shift away from the 
Islamic State and towards the Muslim community itself as the basis of the movement— 
in other words, a shift toward the "grassroots." One of the movements, known as 
Tarbiyah, would evolve into a mainstream post-New Order political party, the PKS 
(Partia Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous Justice Party), led by a reformed former Darul 
Islam member, Hilmi Aminuddin, the son of Opsus agent Danu Mohammad Hasan. 
Another, to which we now turn, was a more radical variant of Darul Islam that 
evolved into the terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah.
One member of the new generation who took up the usroh model was Abdullah 
Sungkar. It is not clear exactly when Sungkar adopted usroh, but his move coincided 
with the development of the Tarbiyah movement in the early 1980s. Although the 
lineages of the different usroh movements are obscure, as van Bruinessen observes, "It 
appears that various groups were influenced by the [Muslim] Brotherhood 
independently of one another and through different channels."132 One difference 
between them, it seems, was demographic: Sungkar's recruits tended to be of a 
provincial or rural background, while Tarbiyah followers were typically urban.133
132 Martin Van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Radical Islam in post-Suharto Indonesia" (2002), Utrecht 
University Website, at http:/ / www.let.uu.nl/ -Martin.vanBruinessen/personal/ publications/ 
genealogies_islamic_radicalism.htm
133 Nursalim describes the Sungkar usroh in this way. See Muh. Nursalim, "Faksi Abdullah Sungkar dalam 
Gerakan Nil Era Orde Baru" (Master's thesis, Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta, 2001), pp. 58-59.
This is also the impression given by the profiles of usroh members published in Tapol, Indonesia: Muslims 
on Trial (London: Tapol, 1987), chap. 7.
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Tarbiyah eventually avoided use of the term usroh after it became associated with the 
more radical usroh of Sungkar.134
Sungkar may have come to usroh through his association with the Indonesian 
Islamic Propagation Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII), a pioneer of 
political dakwah in Indonesia.135 With a background in Masyumi, he was an early 
member of DDII when it was established by former Masyumi leader Mohammad 
Natsir in reaction to Masyumi (and Natsir himself) being barred from politics under 
the New Order. In Solo, Sungkar came to prominence for his politicized sermons, 
broadcast on Radio Dakwah Islamiyah Surakarta (RADIS), which he had helped found 
in 1969. In 1975, RADIS was closed down by Kopkamtib on account of Sungkar's 
critical sermons. Sungkar was regarded as a skilled and highly motivated preacher, 
and in 1970 his appointment as assistant chairman of the Solo branch of DDII enhanced 
his profile. In 1972, he established, with close colleague Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the Al- 
Mukmin pesantren in Ngruki, near Solo.136 Characteristic of Sungkar's innovative and 
eclectic approach, the school's curriculum integrated what were considered the models 
of best practice provided by two existing pesantren: Gontor, for its Arabic course, and 
the Persis school in Bangil for Islamic law.137
As we have seen, Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir were recruited to Darul Islam 
by Hispran in December 1976, at the tail end of the revival. The following year, 
Sungkar was detained for a month by Kopkamtib for boycotting the general election. 
In November 1978, both Sungkar and Ba'asyir were detained on charges of subversion. 
It was alleged that they had given anti-government sermons and refused to honor the 
Indonesian flag at their pesantren. But most damningly, it was charged that they had 
taken an oath with Hispran to defend the Islamic State of Indonesia.
Some have argued that, by this time, Sungkar had already established a dissident 
group of his own, and therefore his recruitment involved the merger of his group with 
Darul Islam. Muhammad Nursalim, a graduate of Al-Mukmin who wrote his master's 
thesis on the Sungkar faction of Darul Islam, recounts that "In the 1970s Abdullah 
Sungkar felt the need to form a jama'ah [congregation or community] as an 
organization for the Islamic struggle."138 According to Nursalim, Sungkar discussed the 
issue with several like-minded preachers in Solo. One of these preachers then formed a 
jama'ah, and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir wanted to join, but "at the advice of Abdullah 
Sungkar and considering the credibility of the leader, the plan was aborted." Later, 
"considering the importance of a jama'ah for dakwah, Abdullah Sungkar established a 
Jama'ah. This new organization was called Jama'ah Islamiyah." Nursalim continues:
The problem arose of what would serve as the parent organization for this newly 
established jama'ah. Because, if only a jama'ah is formed, and later it is encroached
134 Elizabeth Collins, "'Islam is the Solution': Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia" (2004), Ohio 
University website, http: / / www.classics.ohiou.edu/ faculty / collins/islamsolution.pdf.
135 Ibid.
136 Irfan Suryahardy, compiler, Perjalanan Hukum di Indonesia: Sebuah Gugatan (Yogyakarta: Ar-Risalah, 
1982), p. 4.
137 Martin van Bruinessen, "Divergent Paths from Gontor: Muslim Educational Reform and the Travails of 
Pluralism in Indonesia," 2006, p. 197, at http: / / www.let.uu.nl/ -Martin.vanBruinessen/
personal / publications / Bruinessen_Divergent_paths_from_Gontor. pdf
138 Suryahardy, Perjalanan Hukum di Indonesia, pp. 60, 69.
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on by a competing jama'ah, surely an efficacious movement, which is so yearned 
for, will not come to pass. Because of this and various considerations, Jama'ah 
Islamiyah led by Abdullah Sungkar united with Jama'ah Nil [Negara Islam 
Indonesia].139
As this perspective is taken from Sungkar's sympathizers, however, there may 
have been the temptation to overstate the continuity between the Jemaah Islamiyah of 
the 1970s and the Jemaah Islamiyah of the 1990s in order to lend historical authenticity 
to what would otherwise be a relatively new Darul Islam splinter group. After all, 
Jemaah Islamiyah—meaning "Islamic community"—is a rather generic name. But it is 
a fact that the name appears in association with Sungkar and Ba'asyir well before 
Jemaah Islamiyah's formal inauguration in 1993. At their trial, as at other trials of 
Muslims in Central Java, the name Jemaah Islamiyah—among other names for an 
alleged Darul Islam front—was often used by prosecutor and witness alike.140
In any case, it is clear that, prior to joining Darul Islam, Sungkar was a formidable 
political activist in his own right. We can get an impression of the man and the 
preacher from his performance for the court at his subversion trial of 1982. His defense 
statement, published the same year by one of his followers, is a withering and 
articulate critique of New Order Indonesia, just as sophisticated as the celebrated 1979 
courtroom critique of the government delivered by student leader Heri Akhmadi.141 
Sungkar prefaces his attack by warning that he will "speak the truth however bitter," 
apologizing that this might offend the public prosecutor.142 He then singles out the 
prosecutor for failing to conduct his own investigation and, instead, basing the charge 
on an interrogation "done under pressure and based on a violation of fundamental 
human rights" by Kopkamtib, "an unconstitutional institution." The prosecutor "does 
not want to think critically; to separate the problem out by seeing it from all sides." He 
is "happier to think capriciously and reach perfunctory conclusions."143 Sungkar 
recants the confession in which he had admitted swearing an oath to Hispran, saying 
that he was told by his interrogator, "[My task] is to make you admit to swearing an 
oath with H. Ismail Pranoto [Hispran]; if you don't, you won't be released from 
detention for the rest of your life."144 After three days and three nights, during which 
he was not allowed to sleep and was made to stand for hours while being interrogated, 
Sungkar says he confessed. He makes more serious allegations of torture concerning 
his fellow detainees; for example, Abdul Qadir Baraja, he says, was dealt electric 
shocks thirty-one times.
139 Nursalim, "Faksi Abdullah Sungkar," pp. 53-54. Nursalim appears to have based this account on 
interviews in Solo in 2000 with two close associates of Sungkar.
140 See Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, court testimony in Sungkar and Ba'asyir case (Ba'asyir only mentions "Jamaah 
Islamiah" in the context of recanting his interrogation deposition). In the 1982 case of Zubaidi bin Badri in 
Kudus, the prosecution appears to have used the names "Komando Jihad," "Negara Islam Indonesia," and 
"Jamaah Islamiyah" interchangeably. See Keputusan [Decision] in case Pidana No. 4/1982/  Pid.B/ 
PN.Kds., Pengadilan Negeri Kudus.
141 See Heri Akhmadi, Breaking the Chains of Oppression of the Indonesian People: Defense Statement at his Trial 
on Charges of Insulting the Head of State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1981).
142 Suryahardy, Perjalanan Hukum di Indonesia, pp. 60, 69.
143 Ibid., pp. 68-69.
144 Ibid., p. 96.
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In his statement, Sungkar then presents a systematic critique of the New Order's 
treatment of its political opponents. 'The term hijacking," he writes, "... has only been 
known in Indonesia since the New Order regime ... All this hijacking has been master­
minded by the special operations [Opsus] of this regime, the most outstanding figures 
of which are Ali Moertopo and Sujono Humardani."145 Sungkar runs through a litany 
of such political "hijackings," beginning with Opsus actions that "hijacked" the 
Muslim party Parmusi, and including the Indonesian Journalist's Association and 
labor and student organizations. Then he focuses on the rigging of elections to favor 
Golkar, noting the policy that requires government employees to support Golkar 
(;monoloyalitas) and the fact that a permanent quota of the parliament is given over to 
the military.
Sungkar's critique serves to instantiate the theory, articulated most thoroughly by 
Mohammed Hafez in Why Muslims Rebel, that Islamist movements become militant 
when confronted with a combination of political and institutional exclusion and 
repression.146 While Sungkar's appeal is broadly based, invoking principles of 
Indonesian law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, his main theme is that 
the regime has especially impinged upon the political aspirations of Muslims. He cites 
the case of sidelined former prime minister Mohammad Natsir to make this argument:
The New Order authorities have dominated all layers of society, to force their 
opinions ... [thus] a section of the Indonesian Muslim community, because they 
feel that their political aspirations based on the pure teachings of Islam are not 
accommodated, because there is no political party in the name of Islam ... has left 
the political stage and has gone to work in the field of da'wah and Islamic 
education, like, for example, Mr. Mohammad Natsir ... [Because he] feels his 
aspirations for political Islam are not accommodated in any Islamic political 
party, clear and free from all pressures, thus he has been forced to leave the 
political stage since 1967 ... Really, this situation has disturbed and disappointed 
millions of Indonesian Muslims.147
Noting that he himself has followed the path of Natsir into dakwah, Sungkar expresses 
his exasperation at the government for trying to control dakwah also:
Thus, it now seems the field of dakwah and Islamic education has its turn to be 
forced to follow the opinions and thoughts of the authorities, until soon they will 
not allow religious interpretations based on pure religious teachings, but every 
religious interpretation must be in accordance with the opinions and thoughts 
and impulses of the authorities.148
It is indeed true that, since its inception, the New Order regime had marginalized an 
entire stream of Indonesian politics, that represented by the Masyumi party. Masyumi 
had not only been a mainstream party representing "modernist" Muslims, with a
145 Ibid., pp. 74-75..
146 See Mohammed Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), pp. 28-31. In 
Hafez's schema, exclusion in Indonesia under Suharto was mitigated by a political system that was 
nominally inclusive. Repression, it might be added, was relatively selective. Thus not every Islamist's 
experience was as harsh as Sungkar's.
147 Suryahardy, Perjalanan Hukum di Indonesia, p. 91.
148 Ibid., p. 92.
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leader of international stature in Mohammad Natsir; it was also a potential political 
home for deradicalized Darul Islam veterans, almost all of whom had Masyumi 
backgrounds. If the authorities had tolerated Masyumi, this might have helped to draw 
activists away from the realm of underground subversion towards the field of above­
ground political opposition. Sidney Jones has rendered the counter factual more 
vividly: "If political parties had been allowed to exist," she writes, “usroh might have 
led to the creation of something akin to the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired PKS ... 
twenty years earlier, without any association with Darul Islam."149
But in the 1980s, a repressive climate helped to ensure Darul Islam's relevance, and 
in Abdullah Sungkar, the Islamic State had finally found an intellectual worthy of 
Kartosoewirjo. An informed critique of the New Order regime was rare in Darul Islam 
circles at the time. As an orator, Sungkar was probably superior to Kartosoewirjo. The 
latter, who served his political apprenticeship alongside Sukarno under the seminal 
nationalist figure H. O. S. Cokroaminoto, by his own assessment inherited his mentor's 
skill for writing, while Sukarno inherited his skill for oratory.150 Recordings of 
Sungkar's sermons in 1984 reveal a speaker just as charismatic as he was puritanical. 
He treats his congregation to potentially tiresome rants against the bid'a (innovation) of 
birthday celebrations among Muslims, the "danger" of Shi'ism, and the "poison" of 
Western education. But always he holds his audience through the variation of 
emotional tone. Rants are leavened by jokes, wordplay, or clever multilingual 
interpretations of Qur'anic teachings, deploying Arabic, Indonesian, Javanese, and 
sometimes English.151
Through his charismatic leadership, Sungkar became a bridge between what might 
be considered traditional and modern radical Islam in Indonesia. He took Darul 
Islam's insular and backward-looking radicalism and updated it with the 
internationalist political critique and missionary zeal of Dewan Dakwah. Just as 
Kartosoewirjo had recruited the prestige of post-War nationalism to the Islamist cause, 
Sungkar—influenced by key Islamist writers like Sayyid Qutb and Abu al-Ala 
Mawdudi—caught the historical moment by drawing on the puritanical salafi jihadi 
ideology that was ascendant internationally.
By 1985, the government was closing in on dakwah—for Sungkar, the last vestige of 
political space—and the usroh movement loyal to him was being pursued by the 
authorities, an operation that led to hundreds of arrests.152 As the prosecution brought 
an appeal for a longer prison sentence in their ongoing subversion case, together 
Sungkar and Ba'asyir fled to Malaysia. There they would build an international 
following and adopt a more internationalist approach in their mission to bring down 
the New Order regime. From Malaysia, they sent recruits to train in Afghanistan at the 
camp of Mujahideen leader Abdul Rasul Sayaf. Sungkar and Ba'asyir themselves 
traveled regularly to the Middle East and, during the 1990s, to Australia.
Despite being based in Malaysia, trained in Afghanistan, and having established a 
chapter in Australia, Sungkar's faction continued to conceive of itself within the
149 Sidney Jones, "New Order Repression and the Birth of Jemaah Islamiyah" (forthcoming).
150 "Siapa Gerangan Laki-Laki Ini?" Tempo, November 26,1977.
151 Abdullah Sungkar, Khotbah, Sound recording, MP3,1984.
152 For more on the "Usroh Trials," see Tapol, Muslims on Trial, chap. 7.
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framework of Kartosoewirjo's Islamic State. This curious fact is testament to the 
imaginative power of Kartosoewirjo's creation. Malaysian JI recruit and military 
trainer Nasir Abas writes that in Afghanistan all the recruits who were under the 
leadership of Sungkar were members of what he calls "Jamaah NII." Every week, he 
recalls, after Friday prayers the history of the Islamic State of Indonesia was told in 
stages among members of this group. He learned that "The Islamic State of Indonesia, 
that was seen as legitimate, was believed to have been occupied by the Sukarno regime 
... and as such it was an obligation for members of the Jamaah NII to liberate the land 
that is believed to have come under God's Law, that is, Syariat Islam." He was 
informed that "Jamaah NII already had a manual for statehood that had been applied 
during its administration." Even as late as 1992, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir visited the training 
camp in Afghanistan and explained the Kanun Azasy, or constitution of the Islamic 
State. Ba'asyir told the recruits that "Indonesia must be the first place that is liberated 
and struggled for, not Malaysia or Singapore." Nasir says recruits were often reminded 
that the first priority was preparing to fight in Indonesia, and he speculates that this 
was due to three factors: because most members were from Indonesia, because the 
struggle had first begun in Indonesia, and "because of the history of the Islamic State 
that had been recorded in Indonesia."153
Sungkar's secession from the Islamic State finally came on January 1, 1993. Nasir 
Abas, who was still in Afghanistan, recounts being told that Ba'asyir and Sungkar had 
separated from Jamaah NII and that he had a choice: remain loyal to Sungkar or follow 
the then imam of the Islamic State, Ajengan Masduki.154 If he chose Masduki, Nasir 
would be obliged to return home immediately. The same offer was made to the others. 
Those who chose Sungkar had to swear an oath to him as their new leader. Nasir 
concludes:
From early 1993, the Indonesians at the Towrkham training camp, whether taking 
the Military Academy program or the short course, consisted only of those who 
had chosen Ust. Abdul Halim [nom de guerre of Abdullah Sungkar] as their new 
leader under the organization Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah, regardless of whether 
they were students or instructors.155
The explanations that circulate for Sungkar's split from Darul Islam are threefold. 
The first two center on his personal relationship with Ajengan Masduki. The most 
common account reports that Sungkar fell out with Masduki over the latter's tendency 
towards mystical beliefs and practices associated with Sufism. Sungkar, of course, saw 
these as un-Islamic.156 A delegation from Sungkar provided this explanation to Tahmid 
Rahmat Basuki in a meeting in 1993, labeling Masduki as a follower of a tarekat, or Sufi 
order. When Tahmid subsequently questioned Masduki, the latter replied 
dismissively, "the only tarekat I belong to is tarekat NII."157 Still, those who were close to 
Masduki (who died in 2003) admit to his mystical side. What makes this an unlikely
153 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI  (Jakarta: Grafindo, 2005), pp. 
83-85.
154 Daud Beureu'eh had long since been replaced by Adah Djaelani, who was in turn replaced by Ajengan 
Masduki as imam.
155 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, p. 86.
156 See, for example, Nursalim, "Faksi Abdullah Sungkar," pp. 55-56.
157 Interview with Tahmid Rahmat Basuki, Malangbong, September 21, 2009.
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explanation of Sungkar's behavior, however, is that from its genesis Darul Islam 
represented a curious mix of mysticism and militant Islam. It is unlikely that Sungkar 
had not already compromised with Darul Islam's militant-mystic synthesis.158 This 
synthesis was embodied in its founder, Kartosoewirjo. While Kartosoewirjo had been a 
prominent, and hardline, member of the modernist Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union), 
according to Deliar Noer, "his mystical leaning had estranged him from the other 
Sarekat Islam leaders."159 When fighting for Islamic law and an Islamic state under 
Darul Islam, Kartosoewirjo drew on mystical traditions, such as the messianic 
Joyoboyo prophecy that a Ratu Adil, a Just Prince, would appear and establish an age 
of prosperity. This was probably not just a strategy to manipulate support from Darul 
Islam's rural-peasant population base, but was an element of sincere faith and hope. 
Ateng Djaelani recounts a special operation launched by Kartosoewirjo to capture two 
magic kris (daggers), "Ki Dongkol" and "Ki Rompang," that, legend had it, could only 
be taken by the Just Prince or its Islamic equivalent, the Imam Mahdi. When 
Kartosoewirjo was captured, he was still carrying "Ki Dongkol."160 Darul Islam leaders 
besides Kartosoewirjo and Masduki had mystical sides as well, including Sungkar's 
recruiter, Hispran. Testifying in the Hispran trial, Timsar Zubil claimed that Hispran 
believed in the Joyoboyo prophesy, although this was quickly denied by Hispran 
himself.161 But one of Hispran's son's has attested to his father's mysticism.162
The second explanation for Sungkar's separation from Darul Islam also revolves 
around a breakdown in relations between Sungkar and Masduki, but instead places 
emphasis on a dispute over money. As a result of his experiences in Malaysia, Sungkar 
had become a Darul Islam leader like no other. He had an unprecedented international 
reach, and it seems he was able to parley his foreign connections into financial backing. 
It is not surprising that, in such circumstances, he would come into conflict with 
Ajengan Masduki, the titular head of the Islamic State but a much less successful 
leader. While money may have been a factor, it, too, is unsatisfactory as an explanation 
for the split because, in the weak institution that was the Islamic State of Indonesia in 
the 1990s, Masduki was never a threat to Sungkar's operations.
The fundamental problem Sungkar had with the Islamic State was that it proved to 
be an ineffective institution in the struggle to establish Islamic law. This final 
explanation suggests Sungkar perceived that which is obvious to the outside observer: 
the Islamic State does not exist in any practical sense, and therefore it is an unrealistic 
basis for mobilizing a movement. Consider the issue of territory: one might argue that, 
at times in the 1950s, the Islamic State could control territory in rural West Java. But in 
New Order Indonesia, such territorial gains were no longer conceivable. For Sungkar
158 Still, it may be the case that this cultural-doctrinal dimension was more influential in determining 
allegiances at the rank-and-file level. Indeed, further research might consider whether the polarization in 
Indonesian Islam between traditionalism and modernism served as the cultural background to the Darul 
Islam-Jemaah Islamiyah split.
159 Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University 
Press, 1973), p. 148.
160 "Siapa Gerangan Laki-Laki Ini?" Tempo, November 26,1977.
161 Timsar Zubil, court testimony in Hispran trial. Timsar's testimony generally served to undermine the 
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162 Interview with Miftyakhul Falah (son of Hispran), Brebes, July 11, 2007. Miftyakhul claimed that, before 
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and Ba'asyir, the lack of territory amounted to a conclusive practical argument against 
the Islamic State, an argument that they submitted to their Australian followers at the 
time of the separation from Darul Islam. One follower recalls, "Bashir said that to be 
Darul Islam you need to have a place, some land, but they didn't have a place or any 
land, so the view was that the group shouldn't be named as a state any more but 
should just be named after the group or community." 163 In the words of one important 
Jemaah Islamiyah figure, Darul Islam followers who continued to believe in a 
nonexistent Islamic State had their heads in the sand.164
Sungkar's alternative to the Islamic State—a network of cells, or usroh—could be 
seen as an implicit critique of the state's territorial command structure. As we have 
seen, during the Darul Islam revival activists expended much energy on reestablishing 
the Islamic State's centralized structure and hierarchy, only to see that structure easily 
dismantled by the authorities, thanks to government informants working from the 
inside. But Sungkar's ursoh movement—with cells of closely knit members who were 
to refrain from communicating directly with the leadership—was designed to avoid 
mass exposure of members to the authorities if any one member were to be arrested 
and interrogated.165 The movement was successful enough to spread quickly outside 
Central Java, most notably to Jakarta, but further expansion was hampered by strained 
relations with other Darul Islam members, who were displeased by the way usroh 
members operated outside of the territorial command structure.166 167
This change in organizational model, which led from the concept of an Islamic 
State to the formation of Jemaah Islamiyah, has been explained by Abu Rusdan, the 
son of Hispran's deputy in Central Java, Haji Faleh. In 2002, Rusdan was considered to 
be the acting amir (commander) of Jemaah Islamiyah and, more recently, has been 
described in Gatra magazine as the figure most faithful to Sungkar's vision. In an 
interview with the magazine, he explained the break with Darul Islam in this way:
On 1 January 1993, when we separated from the Nil, the most fundamental 
reason was that we wanted to think concretely. If we start from the "Islamic State 
of Indonesia," then the conditions can no longer be met. So we tried to return to 
al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah, the Muslim community.
[Gatra:] Does that mean abandoning the ideal of an Islamic state?
The ideal of an Islamic State is not gone. What's gone is the starting point that we 
still have an "Islamic State." When we were in the Nil, we still followed the 
Islamic State. By separating from the Nil, JI was thinking from square one. Our 
starting point would now be with the jamaah.lb7
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He added that members of the community were to focus on two fields, "education and 
dakwah"—Sungkar's passions since the 1970s.168
By "returning to the community," Jemaah Islamiyah was adopting the philosophy 
and organizational system of its Egyptian namesake, al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya. In 
Afghanistan, Sungkar's recruits had developed a close relationship with Jemaah 
Islamiyah Egypt and perceived a great many similarities in their respective domestic 
situations. As they saw it, both groups suffered under tyrannical secular rulers.169 The 
Indonesian group took the Egyptians' primary text, Mithaq al-Amal al-lslami (The 
Manifesto of Islamic Activism), as its philosophical guide, accepting its advocacy of an 
exclusive community "as the only method of struggle" against a secular ruler and 
pagan society for believers committed to restoring the Caliphate in the way taught by 
the Prophet.170
By 1996, Jemaah Islamiyah was codified in the General Struggle Guidelines of Jemaah 
Islamiyah. Authored by the "Central Leadership Council," this was the founding 
document of Sungkar's new organization. The organization's declared purpose was to 
establish an Islamic state, but it avoided Darul Islam's terminology, using the term 
Daulah Islamiyah to denote an Islamic state, with this state to be "the basis for 
reestablishing a Caliphate in the way of the Prophet."171 Essentially, Darul Islam had 
split over short-term strategy rather than long-term goals. But the split led to a 
reformulation of identity for many in the radical Islamic community that divided 
people according to who would—and who would not—continue to imagine 
themselves as citizens of Kartosoewirjo's Islamic State.
Yet, as the case of Iqbal in the Bali bombings shows, Darul Islam and Jemaah 
Islamiyah have continued to collaborate. Darul Islam recruits have also served in other 
bombing attacks; most notably, Heri Golun, the suicide bomber who carried out the 
2004 attack on the Australian embassy in Kuningan, had a Darul Islam background. In 
these cases of Darul Islam-Jemaah Islamiyah collaboration, the Darul Islam nation or 
community appears to function as a social network in which the movement, Jemaah 
Islamiyah, is embedded. Darul Islam thus continues to be a crucial locus of support 
and regeneration for Jemaah Islamiyah, despite doctrinal differences. Indeed, with this 
model in mind, one might anticipate that the Darul Islam community will continue to 
serve as a network from which a variety of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia 
emerge and subside.
Conclusion
This article has traced the development of the Darul Islam network through 
Indonesia's New Order regime. The analysis demonstrates that the phenomenon of 
Islamic radicalism was not the result of government manipulation, initiated in order to 
discredit political Islam, as many have claimed. Rather, the 1970s saw the revival of
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Darul Islam due to the enduring legitimacy of Kartosoewirjo's Islamic State and the 
political cover provided to Darul Islam by the intelligence chief Ali Moertopo. The 
recrudescence of radicalism known as Komando Jihad was the consequence of Darul 
Islam's taking advantage of a window of opportunity that opened as Moertopo's 
Opsus intelligence organization attempted to commandeer control of the network from 
its traditional patrons in the military. For at least seven years, Opsus provided cover 
for Darul Islam's revival until the army's territorial command finally reasserted its 
authority.
The revival had far-reaching consequences for Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. It 
attracted a new type of Darul Islam recruit, epitomized by Abdullah Sungkar, who was 
militantly opposed to the New Order regime. Through his charismatic and 
entrepreneurial leadership, Sungkar succeeded in transforming a large section of the 
history-obsessed, backward-looking Darul Islam community into a forward-looking, 
goal-oriented revolutionary movement. In so doing, he became the bridge between 
traditional and modern radical Islam in Indonesia. Sungkar's influence culminated in 
the growth of the Darul Islam offshoot, Jemaah Islamiyah, which would become 
Southeast Asia's only transnational terrorist organization. Sungkar may have had the 
capacity to envision and lead JI on his own, but it was his access to the revived Darul 
Islam network that gave him the institutional base he needed to generate a following.
When Abdullah Sungkar separated from Darul Islam, he was rejecting its Islamic 
State and state-based organizational structure. His new organization, Jemaah 
Islamiyah, influenced by recent trends in the Middle East, adopted an ostensibly more 
effective model of recruitment and mobilization based on grassroots activism. No 
longer was the agenda to defend the Islamic State; instead, JI's younger generation of 
recruits was inspired by dreams of destroying the New Order. But, as we have seen, a 
shared past and a common goal in establishing Islamic law in Indonesia has facilitated 
continuing collaboration between Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah, indicating that, 
rather than functioning as a rival movement, Darul Islam readily serves as a network 
of support for Jemaah Islamiyah.
Time is proving Darul Islam to be a remarkably robust network; it may yet make 
newer radical movements look like sectarian ephemera. But like a ruler loath to retire, 
the strength of Kartosoewirjo's Islamic State is its greatest weakness. Its power to move 
people fades with time, and yet it persists, in one form or another, oblivious to its 
diminishing legitimacy. Meanwhile, Indonesia continues to host an imagined 
community of radical Muslims who are connected, if not through their defense of the 
Islamic State, then through kinship, comradeship, and a respect for Kartosoewirjo's 
legacy.
